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A buyer repudiates a fixed-price contract to purchase goods, and
the seller sues for damages. How should a court measure the seller's
loss? The answer seems simple: The seller should be awarded dam-
ages sufficient to place it in the same economic position it would have
enjoyed had the buyer performed the contract.' But the seductive
conceptual simplicity of the compensation principle disguises sub-
stantial practical problems in measuring seller's damages.
Contract law has traditionally minimized measurement difficul-
ties by basing damages in most cases on the difference between the
contract price and market value of the repudiated goods.' The com-
t We would like to thank Albert Clovis, Arthur Leff, Richard Posner, Alan Schwartz,
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1. For a discussion of the efficiency of the compensation principle in contract damages,
see Goetz & Scott, Liquidated Damages, Penalties and the Just Compensation Principle: Some Notes on
an Enforcement Model and a Theop of Effient Breach, 77 COLUM. L. REv. 554, 554-77 (1977).
2. See United States v. Burton Coal Co., 273 U.S. 337 (1927); Garfield & Proctor Coal
Co. v. New York, N.H. & H.R.R., 248 Mass. 502, 143 N.E. 312 (1924); UNIFORM SALES ACT
§ 64(3); 5 A. CORBIN, CONTRACTS §§ 1100-1101 (1950); C. MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK ON
THE LAW OF DAMAGES § 173, at 658-60 (1935). The traditional benchmark for identifying
market values was the market price of the goods at the time of delivery. Although the seller's
resale price was relevant evidence in establishing market value, most common law courts did
not regard it as conclusive. See, e.g., Farish Co. v. Madison Distrib. Co., 37 F.2d 455, 457-58
(2d Cir. 1930). One of the significant innovations of the U.C.C. damages scheme is found in
§ 2-706, which allows the seller to fix market value by making a regulated resale and recover-
ing the contract price-resale price differential. The seller, however, remains free to establish
market damages through the more traditional mechanism of § 2-708(1): the difference be-
tween the contract price and the market price at the time and place of delivery. U.C.C. §§ 2-
706, -708(1).
The simplicity of the contract price-market value damage formula belies its accuracy.
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mon law courts generally limited the seller to such market damages
whenever the seller had a resale market for the contract goods.3
These courts assumed that combining this damage award with pro-
ceeds from a resale would give the seller the profits that performance
would have earned it.
But the contract-market formula is not the universal damage
rule. Such a price differential formula assumes a market in which
the seller has a realistic opportunity to replace the buyer's contract.
Where resale on the market is not feasible, the seller can only recover
its lost profits through alternative recovery rules.4 Most common law
courts admitted an exception only for the seller of special order goods
who reasonably salvaged an incomplete performance: Such a seller
could establish lost profits by directly proving any changes in reve-
nue and cost produced by the breach.5 But as the Uniform Commer-
Measuring damages with this mechanism properly reimburses the seller for losses from a de-
clining market because the contract allocated the risk of a declining market to the buyer. It
also efficiently implements the compensation principle by implicitly providing the seller with
its contractual expectation.
3. See Olcese v. Davis, 124 Cal. App. 2d 58, 61-63, 268 P.2d 175, 177-78 (1st Dist.
1954); Masterton v. Mayor of Brooklyn, 7 Hill 61 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1844); 5 A. CORBIN, supra
note 2, §§ 1039, 1100-1101; C. MCCORMICK, supra note 2, § 173, at 658-60; 2 S. WILLISTON,
THE LAW GOVERNING THE SALES OF GOODS AT COMMON LAW § 582 (2d ed. 1924).
The remedial provisions of the Uniform Sales Act incorporate the "available market"
rule: "Where there is an available market for the goods in question, the measure of damages
is, in the absence of special circumstances showing proximate damage of a greater amount,
the difference between the contract price and the market or current price at the time or times
when the goods ought to have been accepted, or, if no time was fixed for acceptance, then at
the time of the refusal to accept." UNIFORM SALES ACT § 64(3).
4. If the contract goods are on hand at the time of breach and the lack of a market
makes resale at a reasonable price implausible, the seller has traditionally been able to enforce
the contract by recovering the full purchase price. See U.C.C. § 2-709(1)(b); UNIFORM SALES
AcT § 63(3). Specialized remedies were also available at common law if no market existed.
C. MCCORMICK, supra note 2, § 173, at 661-62.
5. The common sense of this rule is self-evident. This category of sellers cannot replace
the breached contract since, by definition, no replacement market exists.
Uniform Sales Act § 64(4), the predecessor of U.C.C. § 2-704(2), was less explicit in
granting the seller of specialized goods the choice of salvaging and recovering lost profits. By
negative implication, § 64(4) applied only when there was no "available market" for the ap-
plication of market damages under § 64(3). The section provided: "[T]he buyer shall be lia-
ble to the seller for no greater damages than the seller would have suffered if he did nothing
towards carrying out the contract or the sale after receiving notice of the buyer's repudiation
or countermand. The proft the seller would have made if the contract or the sale had beenfelly perfomed
shall be considered in estimating such damages." (emphasis added). Although § 64(4) only pro-
vided that the seller's prospective profit would be "considered," the majority of common law
courts held that damages should equal the seller's lost profit when the buyer repudiated
before completion of the special order contract. See, e.g., United States v. Purcell Envelope
Co., 249 U.S. 313, 320 (1919); Miami Cycle & Mfg. Co. v. National Carbon Co., 268 F. 46,
53-54 (6th Cir. 1920). These courts computed estimated profits by subtracting estimated cost
of manufacture or procurement from the contract price. See Snelling v. Dine, 270 Mass. 501,
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cial Code damages scheme supplanted the common law,6 the notion
was advanced that the common law rule erroneously used the con-
tract-market formula to measure loss in several circumstances in
which the compensation principle demanded that the seller recover
by direct proof the profit lost because of the breach.7
Two categories of sellers are typically invoked to illustrate the
failure of market damages to mirror true losses despite an available
market for contract goods. The first-known popularly as the "com-
ponents seller" 8 -includes those cases in which the seller has not fully
504-08, 170 N.E. 403, 404-06 (1930); Gelusha v. Scharoun, 87 N.Y.S.2d 381, 382-83 (Sup.
Ct. 1949).
6. U.C.C. §§ 2-703 to -718. The U.C.C. reflects the traditional market-damage meas-
ures in its treatment of seller's damages. Initially, the Code directs the aggrieved seller to two
equally available market alternatives: (1) It can promptly resell on the market, using the
contract price-resale price formula in § 2-706; or (2) it can rely on hypothetical market oppor-
tunities by proving the contract price-market price differential under § 2-708(1). This choice
depends on whether the expected litigation costs of proving market price are greater than the
administrative costs of a supervised resale. As long as the calculation is ex ante, all other things
being equal, either alternative will produce the same market damages and will permit sellers
to recover implicit profits. The U.C.C. authorizes the direct recovery of lost profits only when
neither market alternative places the seller in a full performance position. U.C.C. § 2-708(2).
Several commentators have criticized the market price-contract price alternative to the
resale formula, arguing that if the seller resells the contract goods, the market formula will
equal true losses only by chance. See J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW
UNDER THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 7-7, at 221 (1972); Peters, Remedies for Breach of
Contracts Relating to the Sale of Coods Under the Uniform Commercial Code A Roadmapfor Article Two,
73 YALE L.J. 199, 258-59 (1963). For example, if contract price is $10, the goods are resold
after breach for $6, and market value at time of delivery is $7, awarding damages under § 2-
708(1) seems to undercompensate the seller. But only when we view the case afier thefact does
a market damages formula appear to under- or overcompensate the seller. If the choice of
remedies is viewed ex ante, the seller has no reason to prefer one alternative over the other
since it presumably cannot predict the market. Thus, the seller will choose the alternative
that minimizes expected breach costs. See Jackson, "Anticipatog Repudiation" and the Temporal
Element of Contract Law. An Economic Inquirg into Contract Damages in Cases of Prospective Non-
Performance, 31 STAN. L. REV. 69, 112-16 (1978).
7. See generally R. NORDSTROM, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF SALES § 177 (1970); J.
WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 6, §§ 7-8 to -13; Childres & Burgess, Seller's Remedies.- The
Pimacy of UCC 2-708(2), 48 N.Y.U. L. REv. 833 (1973); Harris, 4 General Theorvfor Measuring
Seller's Damages for Total Breach of Contract, 60 MICH. L. REv. 577 (1962) [hereinafter cited as
Harris, General Theoy]; Harris, A Radical Restatement of the Law of Seller's Damages: Sales Act and
Commercial Code Results Compared, 18 STAN. L. REv. 66 (1965) [hereinafter cited as Harris,
Radical Restatement]; Peters, supra note 6, at 273-75; Schlosser, Construing UCC Section 2-708(2)
to Appy to the Lost-Volume Seller, 24 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 686 (1973); Speidel & Clay, Seller's
Recovery of Overhead Under UCC Section 2-708(2): Economic Cost TheoV and Contract Remedial Polcy,
57 CORNELL L. REV. 681 (1972).
8. Professor Harris is the source of this nomenclature. See Harris, Radical Restatement,
supra note 7, at 97-98. The "components" label includes all manufacturers who reasonably
elect not to complete the production process as well as jobbers or distributors who reasonably
determine not to acquire the contract goods. See J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 6, § 7-
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manufactured or procured the contract goods at the time of the
breach. Assume, for example, a contract price of $100 and a breach
after a significant decline in the market to $50 at the time for per-
formance. The seller chooses not to complete its contractual prepara-
tions, which would have cost $80.' The buyer contends that market
damages of $50 do not properly measure true losses. Since the con-
tract-market formula bears no rational relationship to the seller's
contemplated or actual investment in the contract, it necessarily dis-
torts the seller's damages. Thus, it is argued, damages can only be
measured accurately by the seller's anticipated profits as revealed by
the $20 difference between the contract price and the estimated costs
of production.10
The "lost-volume seller"" is the second category where market
damages are frequently believed to measure true losses inadequately.
Market resales do not replace or substitute for the breached contract
when such resales would have been made even if the buyer had not
breached. The seller may contend that, while it did in fact resell the
contract goods, the other buyer would have purchased anyway.
Therefore, if the breaching buyer had fully performed the contract,
the seller would have realized two profits from two sales. Since sell-
ing the goods to the second buyer produced only one profit for the
seller, the breaching party ought to pay over the other profit in order
to put the seller in the position it would have achieved had the buyer
9. U.C.C. § 2-704(2) provides: "Where the goods are unfinished an aggrieved seller may
in the exercise of reasonable commercialjudgnent for the purposes of avoiding loss and of efective realization
either complete the manufacture and wholly identify the goods to the contract or cease manu-
facture and resellfor scrap or salvage value or proceed in any other reasonable manner." (emphasis
added).
10. Several commentators have advanced the argument that a "components" sale nec-
essarily excludes a market formula as an accurate measure of the loss. See, e.g., R. NORD-
STROM, supra note 7, § 177; J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 6, § 7-10, at 227; Peters,
supra note 6, at 273.
Although he distinguished resale (retail) and acquisition (wholesale) pries (a problem of
incidental damage under U.C.C. § 2-7 10), Professor Harris recognized that a components sale
does not necessarily impair the use of market damages: "If breach had occurred before acqui-
sition and plaintiff would have acquired the entity in the same market in which he would
have resold it, acquisition value and resale value are identical if both values are measured on
the same date and no transportation costs need be considered. This coincidence of acquisi-
tion and resale values enables courts to reach sound results while ignoring the difficult ques-
tion of whether the goods were on hand or yet to be acquired." Harris, Radical Restatement,
supra note 7, at 77 n.62.
In Part 11, we examine the arguments challenging the accuracy of market damages when
the seller terminates an incomplete performance. See notes 77-82 infra and accompanying
text.
11. Professor Harris is also responsible for this terminology. See Harris, General Theo,,
supra note 7, at 599-605.
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performed. Conventional analysis has assumed that whenever the
seller is able to supply all available buyers at the prevailing price, its
damages are presumptively equal to the entire expected profit lost on
the breached contract.
The Uniform Commercial Code's rules for measuring sellers'
damages reflect these concerns about the inaccuracy of the contract-
market formula. Although the Code retains the general preference
for market damages,12 its draftsmen abandoned the narrow access to
lost profits for sellers of special order goods in favor of a more general
rule awarding lost profits whenever market damages are inadequate
"to put the seller in as good a position as performance would have
done."' 3 Eliminating the "available market" criterion enhanced the
12. See note 6 supra. The contract-resale formula of U.C.C. § 2-706(1) was not generally
available to the seller at common law. Section 60 of the Uniform Sales Act authorized a
resale formula only in limited circumstances. Although resale price was relevant evidence of
the market value at the time of delivery, the seller frequently could not use resale price to
reduce the expected litigation costs of proving market value. The resale formula is a useful
alternative remedy when proof of market value is costly because it permits the seller to fix its
damages with greater certainty.
The alternative market formula of U.C.C. § 2-708(1), authorizing recovery of the "differ-
ence between the market price . ..and the unpaid contract price," is the progeny of the
common law market formula and § 64(3) of the Uniform Sales Act. It completes the Code's
market-damages scheme.
13. U.C.C. § 2-708(2) states that: "If the measure of damages provided in subsection (1)
is inadequate to put the seller in as good a position as performance would have done then the
measure of damages is the profit (including reasonable overhead) which the seller would have
made from full performance by the buyer, together with any incidental damages provided in
this Article (Section 2-710), due allowance for costs reasonably incurred and due credit for
payments or proceeds of resale."
The initial revision of § 64 of the Uniform Sales Act eliminated the "available market"
standard, which had limited the use of the lost-profits measure. The section provided: "Dam-
ages for non-acceptance. The measure of damages for non-acceptance is the difference between
the unpaid contract price and the price current at the time and place for tender together with
any incidental damages under Section 112 but less any expense saved in consequence of the
buyer's breach, except that if the foregoing measure of damages is inadequate to put the seller in as good a
position asperformance would have done then the measure of daaages is the profit the seller would have made
fromfullperformance by the buyer." UNIFORM SALES ACT § 110 (Prop. Final Draft No. 1, 1944)
(emphasis added). Although the draft did not include commentary to explain the change, a
clearer indication of the draftsmen's concerns with the common law rule appeared when the
Uniform Revised Sales Act was incorporated into the 1949 draft of article 2 of the U.C.C.
The revised section became § 2-708 of the U.C.C., and the Code drafters provided the follow-
ing comment: "The provision of this section permitting recovery of expected profits where the
standard measure of damages is inadequate, together with a new requirement that price ac-
tions may be sustained only where resale is impractical, are designed to eliminate the unfair and
economically wasteful results arising under the older law when frOed price articles were involved This
section permits the recovery of lost profits in all appropriate cases, which would include all standardpriced
goods." U.C.C. § 2-708, Comment 2 (1944 draft version) (emphasis added).
Using a market formula for breaches involving standard-priced goods often produced
only nominal damages. It was this apparent anomaly that supported a wider access to lost-
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opportunities for sellers to assert lost-volume claims. 4 Moreover, be-
cause the new rule did not identify the circumstances in which com-
pensating a salvaging seller requires an award of lost profits, it
allowed lost-profit claims even when a market for salvage goods ex-
isted.1 5 The resulting increase in lost-profits claims through the un-
profits damages. See 1 N.Y. LAw REVISION COMM'N ANN. REP. 694-95 (1955). But the
Code draftsmen failed to indicate in the statutory language the circumstances in which lost-
profits awards were appropriate. Instead, as § 2-708 went through subsequent revisions (in-
cluding the division into two subsections), the undiscriminating filter into lost profits re-
mained, as did the commentary describing it.
14. Under the common law rule, as reflected in Uniform Sales Act § 64(3), courts con-
templating a lost-profits award had to maneuver around the "available-market" limitation.
See note 21 infra. The U.C.C., by eliminating this difficulty, allowed courts to recognize
claims on the basis of little evidence. See, e.g., Famous Knitwear Corp. v. Drug Fair, Inc., 493
F.2d 251, 253-55 (4th Cir. 1974); Distribu-Dor, Inc. v. Karadanis, 11 Cal. App. 3d 463,
469-71, 90 Cal. Rptr. 231, 234-36 (3d Dist. 1970); Snyder v. Herbert Greenbaum & Assocs.,
38 Md. App. 144, 380 A.2d 618 (Ct. Spec. App. 1977); Neri v. Retail Marine Corp., 30
N.Y.2d 393, 285 N.E.2d 311, 334 N.Y.S.2d 165 (1972).
15. Expanding lost-profit access under the U.C.C. to accommodate the standard-priced
seller diverted attention away from those sellers who recovered lost profits at common law.
The inartful draftsmanship of the relevant Uniform Sales Act provision, § 64(4), was in part
responsible. This predecessor to U.C.C. § 2-704(2) was supposed to resolve the damage issues
when the buyer repudiated before the seller completed performance. Although section 64(4)
implicitly authorized lost profits for sellers of special-order goods without an available resale
market who elected to salvage their pre-breach preparations, it was principally intended to
encourage sellers to salvage when completing production of the contracted goods would in-
crease the buyer's damages. See, e.g., Hinckley v. Pittsburgh Bessemer Steel Co., 121 U.S. 264,
274-76 (1887) (repudiation of contract to roll steel pursuant to pattern furnished by the
buyer); Lieberman v. Templar Motor Co., 236 N.Y. 139, 148-49, 140 N.E. 222, 224-25 (1923)
(repudiation of contract to purchase automobile bodies built by seller from special design);
Todd v. Gamble, 148 N.Y. 382, 384, 42 N.E. 982, 984 (1896) (repudiation of contract to
supply highly perishable chemical for which no immediate resale market existed).
The common law cases generally adhered to the specialized-goods criterion. If the goods
were products with a ready market, the seller was limited to the market-contract differential.
W.R. Grace & Co. v. Nagle, 275 F. 343, 346 (2d Cir. 1921) (steel); Kincaid v. Price, 18 Colo.
App. 73, 70 P. 153 (1902) (coal); Garfield & Proctor Coal Co. v. New York, N.H. & H.R.R.,
248 Mass. 502, 143 N.E. 312 (1924) (coal); see note 2 supra.
As the rule evolved under the Uniform Sales Act, a seller electing not to complete per-
formance could recover lost profits under § 64(4) by showing it could not make substitute
contracts on the market. Norwood Lumber Corp. v. McKean, 153 F.2d 753 (3d Cir. 1946);
Ahlbin v. Crescent Commercial Corp., 100 Cal. App. 2d 646, 649-50, 224 P.2d 131, 133-34
(4th Dist. 1950). Because the seller was required to make an er ante choice the seller could not
reasonably expect a profitable resale market. Zimmerman Radio Corp. v. Bronson & Town-
send Co., 108 Conn. 632, 634, 144 A. 301, 303 (Conn. 1929).
In its 1949 draft form, U.C.C. § 2-708 did not indicate whether these special-order sellers
were entitled to lost profits. The 1954 revisions added language, unaccompanied by explana-
tion, designed to incorporate an appropriate measurement for the salvage cases: "due allow-
ance for costs reasonably incurred and due credit for payments or proceeds of resale."
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE: AMENDMENTS APPROVED BY ACTION OF THE AMERICAN
LAW INSTITUTE AND THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM LAWS
14 (1954). Because the Code drafters abandoned the "available market" test, however, com-
mentators argued that the salvage decision itselfjustified a lost-profits award. See J. WHITE &
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discriminating medium of U.C.C. § 2-708(2)16 has been based on the
assumption that reselling equivalent goods to others on the market
does not replace the breached contract. But the conclusion suggested
by this assumption-that notwithstanding a resale market for the
goods, market damages frequently measure losses inaccurately-is
neither obvious nor compelled.
Part I of this article attempts to determine more precisely when
compensation requires the award of lost-volume profits. Our analysis
reveals that the seemingly simplistic market damages mechanism is
more accurate than has generally been assumed. Indeed, the appar-
ent reduction in enforcement costs associated with market damages
suggests that, so long as the seller has a market for its goods, the most
efficient damage rule is a rebuttable presumption that the seller re-
places the breached contract.1
Part II examines the mechanism for measuring the losses of those
sellers who salvage an incomplete performance after the buyer's
breach. We conclude that the conventional components claim for
lost profits is overinclusive. Only those sellers of special-order goods
who cannot rely on any market require a lost-profit award. 8 Fur-
ther, economic analysis suggests that courts may frequently overcom-
R. SUMMERS, supra note 6, § 7-10, at 227. Although Professor Harris carefully limited the
implications of his "components" category, subsequent commentary has been less precise,
endorsing lost-profits awards for the "components seller" even when the goods are readily
marketable.
16. The general language providing access to lost profits under § 2-708(2), see note 13
sumpra, has caused considerable consternation in courts evaluating damage claims. Cases
presenting the least difficulty are those involving specially manufactured goods, where the
absence of a resale market induces a salvage decision under U.C.C. § 2-704(2). Courts uni-
formly agree that § 2-708(2) remains the only appropriate measure of damage for the salvag-
ing seller of special-order goods. See, e.g., Anchorage Centennial Dev. Co. v. Van Wormer &
Rodrigues, Inc., 443 P.2d 596, 599 (Alas. 1968); Detroit Power Screwdriver Co. v. Ladney, 25
Mich. App. 478, 181 N.W.2d 828 (1970); Chicago Roller Skate Mfg. Co. v. Sokol Mfg. Co.,
185 Neb. 515, 177 N.W.2d 25 (1970); Timber Access Indus. Co. v. U.S. Plywood-Champion
Papers, Inc., 263 Or. 509, 524-26, 503 P.2d 482, 489-91 (1972).
In only two of these cases, however, was the court asked to rule whether the component-
seller's use of§ 2-708(2) rather than § 2-708(1) depended upon its ability to resell the finished
goods. See Detroit Power Screwdriver Co. v. Ladney, 25 Mich. App. 478, 486, 181 N.W.2d
828, 834 (1970) (dictum) (lost profits remedy applicable where no market exists for contract
item); Timber Access Indus. Co. v. U.S. Plywood-Champion Papers, Inc., 263 Or. 509, 525,
503 P.2d 482, 490 (1972) (dictum) (lost profits awarded even where "some market" existed).
17. This hypothesis mirrors the prevailing common law rule. Contract law traditionally
presumed that if it had an opportunity to resell the goods on the market, the seller could fully
replace the breached contract. Consequently, the difference between the market price and
the contract price of the repudiated goods was thought to measure the seller's losses accu-
rately. See text and citations accompanying note 20 infra.
18. See text accompanying notes 83-91 infra.
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pensate these sellers by failing to credit the breaching buyer with all
of the savings the breach produces. In addition, when several buyers
breach contracts with a single seller, the later breaches generally pro-
duce proportionately larger losses to the seller.
I. THE PROBLEM OF LOST VOLUME
A. Reexamining the Lost- Volume Presumption.- A Replacement Model
Sellers frequently advance lost-profit claims even though there
exists an available market for the contract goods. These sellers claim
that they have lost sales and can only be made whole by recovering
the expected profits on the breached contract. Any breach leaving a
manufacturer with unfilled productive capacity or a retail seller with
standard-priced goods is generally believed to result in a lost sale.' 9
Common law courts were generally skeptical about the validity of
these lost-volume claims. If the contract goods were on hand at the
time for performance, the majority of courts limited the seller to mar-
ket damages, reasoning that any resale adequately replaced the
breached contract.
2 0
Considering the resistance of pre-Code courts, what explains the
paradigmatic lost-volume claim where excess capacity or supply trig-
gers the presumption that an entire profit was lost by the breach?
Disputes involving retailers of standard-priced goods exposed an ap-
parent anomaly: Only nominal damages are awarded when market
price is equivalent to contract price.2' The resulting inference of un-
19. In both cases it is assumed that the ability of the seller to fill future orders (the
manufacturer by expanding production; the retailer by ordering more goods from the whole-
saler) prevents it from replacing the breached contract. Thus the seller "loses" a sale and its
resulting profit. See, e.g., 5 A. CORBIN, supra note 2, § 1100; J. WHITE & R. SuMMERS, supra
note 6, §§ 7-7 to -9; Harris, General Theoy, supra note 7, at 599-601.
20. See, e.g., Berger Mfg. Co. v. Phillips Hotel Operating Co., 89 S.W.2d 703 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1935); A. Lenobel, Inc. v. Senif, 252 A.D. 533, 300 N.Y.S. 226 (1937), modied, 253 A.D.
813, 1 N.Y.S.2d 1022 (1938); Genovese v. A. Lenobel, Inc., 148 Misc. 548, 265 N.Y.S. 338
(Mun. Ct. 1933), rev'don other grounds, 154 Misc. 91, 275 N.Y.S. 521 (App. Term 1934); Riedt
v. Winters Drug Co., 191 Okla. 264, 128 P.2d 1008 (1942).
When the pre-Code courts rejected lost-profits claims, they consistently identified the
existence of "an available market" for resale of the goods rejected by the breaching party as
the critical issue in determining the appropriate damage mechanism. See Charles St. Garage
Co. v. Kaplan, 312 Mass. 624, 45 N.E.2d 928 (1942); Babbitt v. Wides Motor Sales Corp., 17
Misc. 2d 889, 192 N.Y.S.2d 21 (App. Term 1959); Lowas Garage Co. v. Scheer, 199 N.Y.S.
748 (App. Term 1923).
21. Electrical Prod. Corp. v. Mosko, 88 Colo. 447, 297 P. 991 (1931); Torkomian v.
Russell, 90 Conn. 481, 97 A. 760 (1916); Stewart v. Hansen, 62 Utah 281, 218 P. 959 (1923).
When courts awarded lost profits, they did not explicitly use the lost-volume rationale as
a basis for decision. Because of the language of Uniform Sales Act § 64(3), see note 13 sup ra,
coui s found either a "special circumstance" under subsection (3) or no "available market" in
[Vol. 31:323
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dercompensation was reinforced by the gratuitous assumption that
"volume sellers" have virtually unlimited profitable production ca-
pacity.22 In order to evaluate these assumptions, it is first convenient
to create an analytic model in which the seller's ability to replace the
breached contract can be precisely observed. The case of Neri v. Retail
Marine Corp.23 provides a useful starting place for examining the as-
the sense of a costless resale. The feebleness of these efforts to justify a lost-profit recovery
helped generate the movement toward a more neutral access to direct profits in U.C.C. § 2-
708(2). See note 13 supra.
As Professor Harris correctly observed, that the seller recovered only nominal damages
does not mean that the damage award was too small. It can mean that the plaintiff suffered
no losses other than incidental damages. See Harris, Radical Restatement, supra note 7, at 95.
One might object that limiting the retail seller to nominal damages in these circum-
stances would fail to deter breach. This argument, however, misperceives the purpose of the
compensation principle of contract damages. Contract damages do not deter breach, rather
they require a choice between performance and compensatotv damages. This rule promotes
efficient breach decisions by providing the cheapest mechanism by which gains from breach
can be fully exploited. A damage rule that deterred breach would require a costly pre-breach
renegotiation of the assignment of rights--and a redistribution of the gains from breach. Not
only would these additional transaction costs generate inefficiencies, but requiring the
breacher to share some or most of its potential gains with the non-breacher would blunt its
entrepreneurial instincts and reduce its investment in searching for alternative welfare-en-
hancing opportunities. See generally Goetz & Scott, supra note 1, at 558-68.
22. Seegenerally I J. BONBRIGHT, THE VALUATION OF PROPERTY 304-05 (1937); 5 A.
CORBIN, supra note 2, § 1100; W. HANVKLAND, SALES AND BULK SALES 178-90 (3d ed. 1976);
Beale, Damages Upon Repudiation of a Contract, 17 YALE LJ. 443 (1908); Waters, The Concept of
Market in the Sale of Goods, 36 CAN. B. REV. 360, 368-69 (1958); Annot., 24 A.L.R.2d 1008
(1952).
Of all the economic assumptions found in the legal literature, the assumption of "unlim-
ited" capacity or supply has been one of the most misleading. See, e.g., 5 A. CORBIN, supra
note 2, § 1100 ("If the seller is a manufacturer or producer of the subject of the sale, with
capacity to produce enough such articles to supply allprobable customers, the buyer's rejection
does not make possible a second sale that the seller could not otherwise have made. Eveg new
customer would have been supplied even if the buyer had kept the goods and performed his con-
tract." (emphasis added)). Although Professor Harris has carefully exposed the premises nec-
essary for an assumption of expansive capacity, see Harris, Radical Restatement, supra note 7, at
81-83, the analysis has typically been quite careless. See, e.g., W. HAWKLAND, SALES AND
BULK SALES 183 (3d ed. 1976) ("This measure of damages will be used principally when the
seller has an unlimited supply ofgoods that sellfor fixedprices. ... If the buyer has not breached,
the seller would have sold two cars instead of one, for the purchaser on the 'resale' undoubt-
edly would have bought another car. In a situation in which the seller has an unlimitedsuppl of
goods, the value of his bargain with the breaching buyer can be ascertained only by awarding
him the profit he has lost because of the repudiation." (emphasis added)).
Professor Shanker and several students at Case Western Reserve Law School registered
the first serious challenge to the assumption of unlimited capacity. See Shanker, The Casefor a
Literal Reading of UCC Section 2-708(2) (One Proft for the Reseller), 24 CASE W. RES. L. REV.
697 (1973); Comment, A Theoretical Postscript! Miroeconomics and the Lost-Volume Seller, 24 CASE
W. RES. L. REv. 712 (1973). Although these analyses are partially flawed and incomplete,
they nonetheless represent a thoughtful and important first step in debunking the lost-volume
myth.
23. 30 N.Y.2d 393, 285 N.E.2d 311, 334 N.Y.S.2d 165 (1972).
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sumptions which support lost-volume claims.
Retail Marine, a dealer in marine equipment and supplies, con-
tracted to sell a new boat to Neri for $12,500. Marine then ordered
and received the boat from its supplier. Six days after the agreement
Neri repudiated the contract. Four months later Marine sold the
boat to another buyer for the same price. When Neri sued to recover
his downpayment, Marine counterclaimed for lost profits of $2,500
under U.C.C. § 2-708(2), arguing that absent Neri's default it would
have earned two profits rather than one. The New York Court of
Appeals sustained Marine's lost-volume claim, holding that "the con-
clusion is clear from the record-indeed with mathematical cer-
tainty-that [market damages are] inadequate to put the seller in as
good a position as performance. . . and hence. . . the seller is enti-
tled to its [profit] ."24 The court categorized Retail Marine's situation
as that of a dealer with an "inexhaustible" supply of boats; conse-
quently, the second buyer did not replace the first.
The court's characterization of the resale as a nonreplacement
logically supports Marine's lost-volume theory of recovery, but the
record in Ne did not warrant this underlying nonreplacement as-
sumption. Mere abzYity to supply additional volume in no way im-
plies that such volume could have been supplied profitably. Even
where the seller's ability to expand output seems virtually un-
bounded, logic indicates that a combination of cost and revenue re-
straints necessarily limits this ability. In a competitive market,
Marine would have no control over price; therefore, its ability to sup-
ply additional potential boat buyers would be limited by increasing
operating costs. 25 Alternatively, in a market where Marine had some
control over price, the reduction in total revenues that price cutting
ultimately imposes would restrain Marine from expanding volume at
will by lowering price.26 In either case, as we shall argue below, the
breached volume may nonetheless be replaced whenever there exists
24. Id. at 399, 285 N.E.2d at 314, 334 N.Y.S.2d at 169 (quoting U.C.C. § 2-708(2)).
25. See notes 29-30 infra and accompanying text. A generally thoughtful and carefully
constructed student comment first used economic analysis to challenge the classic lost-volume
claim in both competitive and monopolistic markets. Comment, supra note 22. Although the
analysis of competitive markets is sound, the analysis of monopolistic markets is flawed by an
erroneous assumption of price-cutting ability on the part of sellers with market power. Id. at
719-28.
26. Because the seller with market power can always lower price to find new buyers it is
tempting to assume that such a seller will never "lose" a sale, since price cutting would even-
tually find a replacement. See Comment, supra note 22, at 722-26. This analysis incorrectly
assumes that the reduction in total revenues that lowering price ultimately produces will not
restrain the seller. If price reductions were profitable, the seller would make them even if the
breaching buyer performed. Since the seller will reduce price if it maximizes profits regard-
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an available resale market for the contract goods. In any event, the
absence of evidence establishing the market and cost conditions for
Marine deprived the court of any sound basis for holding that only a
lost-profits award would make Marine whole. What factors, then,
should be considered in assessing an accurate damage award? We
shall attempt to address that question below with a series of models
which isolate the key elements necessary to support a lost-profit
claim.
1. Measuring damages in a competitive market.
Although perfectly competitive market conditions in the textbook
sense rarely exist, hypothesizing them clarifies the conceptual
problems in replacement-sale situations. Suppose that the evidence
in Neri showed that Retail Marine sold its boats in competition with
over a dozen other retailers, each of which carry the standard na-
tional brands of marine equipment and supplies. Because a boat is a
major purchase, consumers "shop around" and react sensitively to
price differences among sellers.
Such facts are consistent with the hypothesis that Marine lacked
market power and was the "price taker" of the traditional competi-
tive model in economic theory. What does this hypothesis imply? In
a purely competitive market, any post-breach sale is a replacement
for the breached contract and never embodies lost-volume profits.
This is true by definition, since in a perfectly competitive market the
seller can dispose of all output produced at the going market price. 7
Figure 1 summarizes this result.
In Figure 1, the height of the line MR measures the marginal
additions to revenue as quantity sold is varied along the horizontal
axis. This marginal revenue curve is perfectly horizontal because ad-
ditional sales by the competitive seller have no influence on price.
The marginal revenue curve's height OP* is equal to the market
price for noncontractual output including replacement sales. As-
sume that marginal production costs vary with output as represented
by curve MC. A commercially reasonable seller 28 will sell Q units
after the breach, precisely the same number as if the buyer had not
less of whether the buyer breaches, the possibility of price cutting is not relevant to whether
the seller replaces the breached contract.
27. Comment, supra note 22, at 717. Generally, a seller will not use any excess capacity
to supply buyers beyond the point Q, at which marginal cost and marginal revenue are
equal. This analysis assumes sufficient demand to allow the seller to maintain output at Q.
28. The behavior of a "commercially reasonable seller" mirrors the economic notion of
a profit-ma'ximizer who sells to the point at which marginal cost equals marginal revenue.
February 1979]
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If we assume that the breached contract was for some quantity X
at price Pk, how does the seller's post-breach position compare to its
position under full performance? Had the buyer honored the con-
tract, the marginal revenue on X of the units sold would have been
higher by the contract-market price differential (Pk - P*), and the
seller's revenues would have exceeded actual revenues by the shaded
rectangular area in Figure 1. In the normal case, where the repudi-
ated quantity X is less than or equal to the post-breach volume Q,
the replacement sale of X units under U.C.C. § 2-70630 yields true
losses as measured by the difference between resale and contract
prices. In the unusual case where the contract exceeds the optimal
volume Q at the current market price P*, the seller may be obliged to
claim damages on units that would be unprofitable to produce under
the post-breach conditions . t But, as long as the goods have an avail-
able market, the contract-market formula still measures these addi-
tional losses appropriately. The only change from the standard
result is that where the seller is left with unproduced goods, it has
29. If the brea'h occurs before production, the seller would presumably produce at Q
whether the contracted quantity was greater than, less than, or equal to Q.
30. For a discussion of seller's resale remedy, see note 12 supra. An action based on
hypothetical resale through proof of market value under U.C.C. § 2-708(1) achieves the same
result.
31. After a seller contracts to produce a quantity larger than Q, other factors such as a
change in the relative costs of production may make some units unprofitable.
[Vol. 31:323
LOST-PROFITS PUZZLE
saved costs that it would have incurred on performance. Figure 1
shows the appropriate concept of costs to be credited against the con-
tract-market differential. Assume a very large contract, such that the
difference between the optimal volume Q and the original contract
volume Z will not be commercially reasonable to produce if the
buyer breaches the contract. The gross costs avoided by not produc-
ing units in the range between Q and Z are represented by the entire
cross-hatched area under the marginal cost curve in Figure 1. But
nonproduction also deprives the seller of revenues (QeiZ), which it
would have gained from reselling the units at the market price. Area
efgh corresponds to the correct damages attributable to the unpro-
duced part of the contract, based on the standard formula of the
contract-market differential (the entire rectangle efgi) minus the net
avoided costs (triangle ehi).32 This added complication in no way
affects the fundamental result that any resale in a competitive mar-
ket must constitute a replacement creditable as an offset to the origi-
nal breach. In sum, a perfectly competitive market rules out the Neri
court's award of lost-volume damages. Such an award would place
the seller in a better position than performance.
33
2. Aeasuring damages for the seller with market power.
The perfectly competitive model is too simple for the real world.
First, few sellers are perfect price takers able to sell all of their output
at the market price. Second, a firm's marginal operating costs in
32. The Code market-damages scheme clearly incorporates these cost savings. U.C.C.
§ 2-706 and § 2-708(l) both include a deduction from damages for "expenses saved in conse-
quence of the buyer's breach."
33. This conclusion assumes that in a competitive market buyers are not scarce at the
market price and that firms' sales are constrained only by rising operating costs. Though
rising operating costs may not be empirically determinable, once we posit competitive de-
mand conditions, rising marginal costs necessarily follow because otherwise each firm would
supply an infinite volume of goods at current market prices. If we assume marginal revenue is
constant, cost must rise in order to yield a determinate and finite profit-maximizing output
with marginal cost equaling marginal revenue. For example, a commodities seller has any
number of buyers for its output. The reason an individual seller does not supply all the
demand for wheat or corn is that ultimately the costs of producing or selling additional units
exceed expected revenues. Such a seller will sell the same volume whether or not a given
buyer breaches. Awarding this seller the entire profit "lost" from the breach places it in a
better position than performance would have, thus violating the compensation principle.
Although the assumption of pure competition is a strong one for most markets, a number
of real-world circumstances approach this idealized polar case. The legal implications of
damage measures for those cases which cluster toward the competitive model are explored
more fully below. See text accompanying notes 63-64 infta. The next section of this article
considers the effects of breach where competitive conditions cannot be assumed even as a
plausible approximation.
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many cases may be nearly constant over wide ranges in output.
Hence we must extend the analysis to more complex cases.34
In a purely competitive market, the seller cannot affect the price
at which its goods are sold. If it increases its price, it will lose all
sales.35 By contrast, a seller with market power can increase price
and still retain many of its buyers. 6 We can illustrate conditions of
market power by assuming a different set of facts about the seller in
Nei. Assume now that Marine is one of three large retailers of com-
mercial boating equipment and supplies in a large metropolitan
area. Not only do these retailers carry national brands, but each firm
carries under its own name a variety of locally manufactured equip-
ment. Marine is therefore selling in a mixed market which econo-
mists associate with monopolistic competition. If Neri's breach
occurred under these conditions, how would Marine's damages be
measured? The replacement price of the repudiated boat triggers the
appropriate damage measure. If Marine cannot resell the boat in its
marketing area for a "reasonable price," it can use § 2-709 to enforce
the contract and recover the full purchase price from Neri.37 On the
other hand, when Marine can resell the goods, then either of the
U.C.C.'s market damage measures will provide the appropriate price
34. One of the "more complex cases" not dealt with at all in this article is where market
power exists in the buying side of the market, ie., so-called monopsonistic or oligopsonistic
markets. There are two reasons for this omission. One is that these situations are of compara-
tively little empirical importance. The second is, quite frankly, an expositional one. When
market power exists on both sides of the market, the relevant analytical models are not only
immensely more complex, but they also yield a range of indeterminacy in their results. For a
relatively straightforward indication of how the material below would be modified by the
inclusion of buyers' market power, the interested reader may consult the "bilateral monop-
oly" section of any standard microeconomic theory text. See, e.g., G. STIGLER, THE THEORY
OF PRICE 207-09 (3d ed. 1966).
35. Reexamining Figure 1 will confirm this basic economic assumption. In a competi-
tive market, the firm is a "price taker" facing a market price, and its production decisions do
not affect the horizontal line MR.
36. Market power is defined as the ability to affect the quantity of goods sold by adjust-
ing prices. The demand curve for such a seller is downward-sloping.
37. Under U.C.C. § 2-709(l)(b) the seller can recover the purchase price of identified
goods if it is "unable after reasonable effort to resell them at a reasonable price or the circum-
stances reasonably indicate that such effort will be unavailing." The central question is what
constitutes a "reasonable price." As the analysis below will suggest, a buyer will breach
rather than accept and resell only if it believes that the seller can resell more cheaply. See
notes 48-50 infla and accompanying text. If the buyer did not think the seller had a competi-
tive advantage, it would be indifferent between performance and its own resale on the one
hand and breach and damages on the other.
The purchase-price recovery under § 2-709(1) (b) is therefore the mechanism allowing a
seller to refuse an "offer" to resell by showing that it is not best able to minimize the costs of
the breach. Thus, a "reasonable price" under § 2-709(1)(b) is any price higher than the sum
of the price the buyer could achieve plus the transaction costs of resale by the buyer.
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adjustment.3s But if Marine wants to recover additional damages
through a lost-volume claim, can it properly invoke lost-profit recov-
ery under § 2-708(2)? The model developed below considers this
question.
The model embodied in Figure 2A assumes that Marine can sup-
ply boats at an increasing marginal cost, as indicated by curve MG.
S
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A seller such as Marine will typically offer this output in two distinct
markets. Some portion of its profitable capacity will be committed
to fixed contracts for future performance. In addition to its contrac-
tual obligations, the seller will also examine the possibilities of selling
some additional output to other buyers at spot prices. When one of
its contractual obligations is breached, this noncontractual market
will generally provide the seller opportunities for resale. In Figure
2A, the number of units under contract (including Neri's) is repre-
sented as X units. 39  Marine's pricing and output decisions for
additional sales of units not contractually obligated are constrained by
38. See note 12 supra.
39. Although our analysis assumes that a seller will produce goods for sale in both mar-
kets-the contract market and the spot market-Figure 2A and subsequent graphs will depict
the dynamics of output only in the spot market because it alone provides the potential for
replacing contractual output lost by breach.
For its contractual goods, Marine's marginal revenue curve will be at the height of the
fixed contractual prices for the contract units. Ordinarily, in the case of breach this will be at
a point equal to or greater than the intersection of the spot MR curve with the zero axis for
spot production. If the contract price were less than the spot price and if transaction costs for
buyer resale were not high, the buyer could profitably resell rather than breach. On the other
hand, if the contract price is higher than the market price, the buyer's incentive to perform




the negatively sloped market demand curve D and the corresponding
negatively sloped marginal revenue curve MR. As Figure 2A is
drawn, Marine contemplates filling its contractual obligations for X
units and then selling additional units at a price of P, until Q units
are sold. The output and pricing of the additional units is deter-
mined by the intersection of the marginal cost curve MC, and the
marginal revenue curve MR at the profit-maximizing output.4"
How will Neri's breach affect Marine's decisions about output
and pricing? In Figure 2A, the area representing contractual sales
would shrink by B units, the amount of the breach, to X-B. If the
curves determining the optimal number of additional noncontractual
sales remained unchanged, Marine could legitimately assert a lost-
volume claim. In such a situation, the court should reject Neri's ar-
gument that any additional sale "replaces" the breached order be-
cause Marine would indeed have "lost" the entire profitable volume
represented by Neri's repudiated order. But the key factual premise
of this lost-volume contention is invalid. The market for additional
sales does not remain unaffected by the breach. Rather, removal of
Marine's contractual obligation changes its price and cost con-
straints, expanding the opportunity for profitable additional sales.
Figure 2A reflects one of the changed circumstances Neri's breach
produces. The breach brings about a significant change in the
seller's marginal cost curve, resulting in lower costs and enhanced
profitability for noncontractual sales. Some formerly unprofitable
additional sales now become profitable. Had the breach not oc-
curred, the seller would have sold X units under fixed contract and
Q units in spot sales. Because the seller's marginal costs are increas-
ing, the breach relieves it of the increasing costs attributable to the
breached contract. Thus, if the breached contract equals B units, the
relevant marginal cost curve for additional sales will shift to MC2,
which is B units to the right of MC,, the pre-breach marginal cost
curve.4 ' As reflected in Figure 2A, post-breach marginal costs for all
noncontractual units of production are lower than they would have
been had the buyer performed.
40. Figure 2A is drawn to reflect Marine's production situation after concluding its con-
tract with Neri. The Neri contract is a fixed obligation for future performance. Marine will
sell to other buyers on the spot market as long as the marginal revenues from additional sales
are greater than or equal to the corresponding marginal cost of producing each additional
unit.
41. While the marginal cost curve the seller faces for all units produced does not actu-
ally change, the relevant range of the curve the seller is able to exploit for noncontractual
sales is different in the pre- and post-breach situations. We can explain this phenomenon
graphically:
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What are the implications of this reduction in marginal costs? In
Figure 2A the new marginal cost curve MC 2 produces an expansion
in profitable spot market sales from Q to Q 2. The additional AQ
sales are fewer than the B units breached by the buyer, but they do
constitute a partial replacement for the breached contract. The
amount of cost savings produced by the buyer's breach is directly
related to the slope of the seller's marginal cost curve; the lesser the
slope, the lesser the replacement possibilities. A seller operating
under constant marginal costs does not experience any production
diseconomies; thus, the breach does not save the costs which perform-
ance would have incurred. Such a seller's post-breach quantity of
noncontractual sales is precisely equal to its initial profit-maximizing








Figure 2A, represents the seller's pre-breach condition. The X-axis measures two relevant
quantities-total goods produced and total noncontractual goods produced. The former is
measured from the Y-axis and the latter from the Y*-axis. The difference between the Y-axis
and the Y*-axis equals the amount of goods produced to meet contractual obligations. Figure
2A 2 represents the seller's situation after a breach of AB units. The seller's marginal cost
curve MC has not changed nor have the spot-market demand and marginal revenue curves.
The decrease in the seller's contractual obligation moves the Y*-axis leftward B units. The
first units produced to supply spot-market demand are produced at lower marginal costs than
in Figure 2A1 , when the seller had larger contractual obligations.
Production of units for noncontractual sales can be varied depending on market condi-
tions. As Figure 2A shows, the breach has two significant effects. The seller loses contractual
sales, but it gains some noncontractual sales because the spot-market portion of the marginal
cost curve is lower than before. The total effect of these changes is less than B.
42. When the seller's marginal costs are constant throughout the relevant range of out-
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The preceding analysis may suggest that a seller operating under
constant marginal cost conditions will sustain classic lost volume
put, as represented by MCo in Figure 2A3 , the profit-maximizing amount of noncontractual







43. A vertical marginal cost curve can occur, for example, where productive capacity is
fixed.
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from a buyer's breach. However, in addition to its impact on costs,
the buyer's breach also significantly affects the seller's replacement
market. This effect is isolated in Figure 2B, where marginal costs are
held constant over the relevant range of output. As long as perform-
ance remains a possibility, the seller's market for additional spot
sales, represented by the demand curve D1, reflects the risk that the
buyer will dispose of the goods by reselling in the same market.
Before the breach, the buyer can act as a seller to the extent of its
contract. The buyer's breach removes this risk, thereby causing the
seller's demand curve for noncontractual sales to shift rightward to
D2. Since the buyer's resale potential no longer exists, the seller can
ignore the residual demand curve D, in favor of the market demand
curve D2. 4
In a frictionless environment, 5 as represented by Figure 2B, a
breach of B units produces a corresponding shift of B units in the
seller's demand curve. If the demand curve is linear, the seller's mar-
ginal revenues decline at twice the rate of any reduction in price, and
the breach will produce a shift of only .5B units in the resulting mar-
ginal revenue curve MR 2. Since the seller will not rationally expand
output when marginal costs exceed marginal revenues, the additional
profitable output from Q to Q2 produced by the shift of B units in
demand will be smaller than the B units breached by the buyer.46
44. The residual demand curve D, reflects the buyer's ability to resell the goods as a
second seller, thus creating a duopoly situation. The new seller's supply is completely inelas-
tic at B units. The demand curve D I represents the market demand curve D2 minus the new
seller's supply curve. In turn, the new seller's supply curve is determined by its costs of mak-
ing each unit available, considering both selling costs and the retention value of the goods.
(In the limiting case where both such costs are zero, the new seller's supply curve is a vertical
line at the contractual quantity.) Ronald Coase first introduced this concept of residual de-
mand to the economics literature in an analysis of pricing by firms with different cost condi-
tions. See Coase, The Problem fDuopoy Considered, 2 Rav. ECON. STUD. 137 (1935). It has
been used more recently in Nutter, Duopoy, Oligopoy and Emerging Compe ition, 30 S. ECON. J.
342 (1963).
45. This assumed frictionless environment has two components: (1) the buyer will be
able to resell the purchased goods in the spot market under the same conditions the seller
faces for noncontractual units; and (2) there are no costs to the buyer associated with the
resale.
46. An increase in quantity produced from Q to Q 2 reduces the price at which the
additional output A Q can be sold and requires the seller to lower its price on those additional
sales which were projected prior to the breach, thus reducing the firm's revenues on those
sales. Any reduction in price associated with an expansive readjustment by a seller with
market power reduces revenues on all units of production, causing marginal revenues to de-
cline more rapidly than price. In the special case of the simple linear demand curves used in
Figures 2A and 2B, marginal revenues decline at precisely twice the rate of any reduction in




Although this analysis suggests that any shift in demand associ-
ated with the breach will only partially replace the lost contract,
closer analysis will confirm that a shift of B units in the seller's non-
contractual demand curve will actually place the seller in a better
position than had the buyer performed. Figure 2B summarizes this
result. Following the breach-induced demand shift, a seller could ex-
pand noncontractual output at the pre-breach price P1, readjusting
output from Q, to Q 3. This readjustment would equal the B units
breached, thus fully replacing the breached contract. But the seller
with market power will not expand output to fully replace the volume
lost by the breach. By producing only the additional quantity AQ,
(Q 2-Q), this seller can raise its price to PB and earn total profis
exceeding those from a full replacement expansion from Q, to Q3 at
the lower (pre-breach) price P1.
A shift of B units of demand will therefore always produce an
expansion in profitable output equal to some fraction of the breached
units and a new profit-maximizing price that will allow the seller to
more than fully replace revenues lost by the breached contract. The
seller's ability to exploit the breach and exceed the gain available
from performance is a function of the seller's assumed monopoly
power. If the breach permits the seller to recapture buyers for the
full amount of the breached units, market power produces monopoly
profits exceeding the gain from full performance.
Our assumption that but for the breach the buyer would sell the
goods in competition with the seller explains this result. If the trans-
action costs were zero, the monopolist would be better off if fixed
obligations were breached, thereby eliminating the breaching buyer's
ability to "spoil" the market through resale. Since the compensation
principle ensures the seller full recovery from a breaching buyer, the
monopolist is better off after a breach because it can earn monopoly
profits on sales to recaptured buyers. In essence, the contract-market
formula presumes a competitive market. This damage rule
overcompensates the seller with market power, unless the buyer is
credited with these additional breach-related profits as "expenses
saved in consequence of the buyer's breach."47
The demand effect of breach is conceptually independent of the
47. Because the model is developed in a frictionless environment, it is not surprising that
few real-world applications of this phenomenon can be observed. Some positive transaction
costs are associated with any breach. It is difficult to estimate how many sellers, in fact, do
better by breach plus damages than by performance. However, the theoretical validity of the
model is relevant to the choice of the presumption that operates most efficiently to assign loss
where information costs prohibit true measurement.
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cost effect. Indeed, in any case where marginal costs are increasing,
savings in marginal costs will provide an additional opportunity to
expand output beyond the expansion attributable to a shift in de-
mand. Figure 2C illustrates the combined effects of both of the
changed conditions attributable to a buyer's breach. First, the
breach produces a shift of B units in the demand for noncontractual
sales, causing a .5B shift in the resulting marginal revenue curve
MR 2. If marginal costs were constant, as reflected in cost curve MC.,
the breach-induced shift in demand would produce a profit-maxi-
mizing expansion of output from Q, to Q 2 at a new price of P.. As
noted above, in the frictionless sale situation this expansion results in
profits greater than those gained from performance. Assuming that
the seller's marginal costs are increasing, as represented by cost curve
MC1, the breach causes the seller's post-breach marginal cost curve
MC 2 to shift B units rightward. This second effect enhances the re-
placement possibilities of the breach by permitting a profitable ex-
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The replacement phenomenon observable in the preceding model
is based on two basic economic premises: First, marginal disecono-
mies of scale or increasing marginal costs exist in the production
process. Under these circumstances, a breach lowers the cost of the
last contractual unit produced, thus making it profitable to partially
expand the output for noncontractual sales. Second, the buyer's
breach-performance choice also affects the seller's market for addi-
tional sales. The buyer's decision to breach will occur in several
stages. Initially, changed circumstances may make other opportuni-
ties preferable to retaining goods. At that time the buyer must de-
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cide how best to salvage the contract. It can breach, or it can accept
delivery of the goods and resell them in the seller's market. Once we
posit compensatory damages, the buyer's decision whether to breach
or accept delivery of the unwanted goods and then dispose of them
depends on whether the seller can resell the contract goods on the
buyer's behalf more cheaply than the buyer could sell them. Where
neither party enjoys any advantage in reselling the goods, the buyer
has no incentive to choose breach over its own attempts at disposi-
tion. Performance and resale yield the same post-contract result as
breach and payment of damages.48 Thus, the buyer's belief that the
seller enjoys a comparative advantage in reselling the goods will in-
duce it to breach.49 The breach permits the seller to capture the ad-
ditional resale purchaser who Would have bought from the buyer on
resale had the contract been performed.
50
But what happens if the shift rightward in noncontractual de-
mand is less than the full amount of the B units breached? This
possibility exists when the buyer's costs of resale in the market exceed
the seller's. This disparity occurs in most markets.5' Assume, for ex-
ample, that market entry is costly for the buyer, or that the price
includes risks which the buyer is reluctant to assume. In such cases
the buyer may prefer other choices, including retaining the un-
48. This observation is necessarily inferred from' the compensation principle of contract
damages. The goal of contract damages is not to induce performance, but merely to require a
choice between performance and compensatory damages. See Goetz & Scott, supra note 1, at
558.
The compensation principle induces a party to breach in order to capture the gains from
alternative opportunities whenever the payment of expectation damages makes the non-
breacher indifferent between breach and performance. This result is "efficient" since the non-
breaching party loses nothing, while the breacher benefits from non-performance.
Once a compensation principle is postulated, however, no incentives would lead a buyer
to prefer breach over performance. In either case the buyer suffers a loss equal to the differ-
ence between the contract price and the market price for the goods.
49. The damage rule will operate efficiently where it induces a breach by the buyer
whenever the seller has an ex ante resale advantage. Such a rule permits the parties to mini-
mize the costs of breach.
50. The buyer's ability to resell in the seller's market is a central part of the thesis sup-
porting the replacement effect observed in the model. Although the observation may initially
seem counter-intuitive, the argument has been made successfully in one lost-volume case. See
A. Lenobel, Inc. v. Senif, 252 A.D. 533, 300 N.Y.S. 226 (1937), modfed, 253 A.D. 813, 1
N.Y.S.2d 1022 (1938).
51. Higher resale costs for the buyer could be expected in a wide range of circum-
stances. Except in near-perfect markets such as the securities and commodities exchanges, the
buyer will encounter barriers to entry making resale more costly relative to other options,
such as retaining the unwanted goods. In addition, the resale may require the buyer to as-
sume risks of defects in quality or title that are particularly costly for it to bear. In sum,
absent empirical data, greater reselling costs for the buyer would seem to exist in most
markets.
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wanted goods, over a resale in the seller's market. Higher resale costs
reduce the risk that a performing buyer will resell in the seller's mar-
ket; therefore, the seller will not discount the demand for additional
sales by the full amount of the contract goods. In this case, D, will be
closer to D2 in Figures 2B and 2C. Thus, breach will produce only a
partial shift in demand, possibly resulting in less than total replace-
ment of lost profits. Alternatively, in a mixed market with monopo-
listic competition there may be several sellers with overlapping
markets. In this case all sellers share the risk of resale by any buyer.
52
Higher buyer resale costs or the presence of additional sellers reduce
the risk that buyer's resale would capture B units of the seller's spot
market. This lower risk is reflected by a discount of less than B units
in the seller's pre-breach residual demand curve. Thus, the breach
will only partially expand the seller's spot market and losses may not
be fully replaced. The precise impact of either entry costs or shared
resale risk cannot be generally determined.
In sum, the existence of higher resale costs for the buyer, as well
as the presence of competing sellers in the market, may result in less
than total replacement of the breached contract.53 The amount of
revenue replaced by the breach will vary directly with the amount of
breach-related expansion in the seller's market. As long as the
"available market" assumption holds, however, the breach will pro-
duce some expansion in the seller's market for additional sales.
54
This new opportunity will make possible at least a partial replace-
ment of the breached contract. The amount of replacement in indi-
vidual cases can be more confidently predicted by observing the
polar relationship between the competitive and market-power ,re-
placement models. In retail markets additional sellers and higher re-
sale costs for consumer buyers might suggest that a seller with market
power could effect only minimal replacement by breach-induced
52. A seller dominating the market captures substantially all of the enhanced demand
from eliminating the resale competition. When other major competitors are present, any
effects of variations in resale competition are shared among the sellers roughly in proportion
to their market shares.
53. The limiting case where no portion of the seller's lost volume would be replaceable
requires the coincidence of two conditions--constant marginal costs and impossibility of re-
sale. Here, by definition, the breach would affect neither the seller's cost conditions nor its
market. In such a case, where no expansive readjustment is possible, the buyer can compen-
sate the seller for the breach of B units only by giving the seller its entire expected profit.
54. Although conditions of constant marginal costs over a wide range of output can be
routinely predicted, the "available market" assumption necessarily excludes absolute barriers
to buyer's resale at any price, because it requires a market for the goods and at some discount
the buyer would be able to resell the contract goods.
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changes in cost and demand conditions. Yet these same assumptions
also imply that the seller's market more nearly approaches the com-
petitive model observed in Figure 1. As the seller's demand curve
approaches the horizontal line of pure competition, the assumption
that the seller's volume is constrained by rising costs rather than lack
of buyers becomes more compelling. If buyers can be found at or
near the market price, substantial replacement by resale would be
predicted. Conversely, in commercial markets with fewer and larger
sellers, a seller will have greater market power but also a limited
number of buyers at any specified price. Yet this seller can be ex-
pected to exploit breach-related changes in costs and demand in or-
der to substantially replace lost revenues.55
3. Summany of the replacement model.
Obviously, the seller's capacity to supply the breached units in
addition to its actual output is a necessag condition for a lost-volume
claim. The lost-volume presumption mistakenly assumes that excess
productive capacity is also a sufficient condition for such an award.
But the relevant issue is not whether the post-breach firm had the
physical capacity to produce the breached units in addition to its
actual volume, but whether it would have been profitable to do so.
The validity of a lost-volume claim depends entirely on the efect ofthe
breach on the seller's ability to sell to other buyers profitably.56 If
55. This observation can be illustrated with a simple example. Assume that the buyer
breaches a contract to purchase one Olympus camera from a camera store in Washington,
D.C. The seller sues for an entire lost-volume profit of $25. Clearly, the existence of many
competing camera sellers, and the apparent ability to sell many cameras without substan-
tially increasing marginal costs, seem to undercut the buyer's claim that the breach removes a
resale risk, thus permitting the seller to recapture another buyer. But the factual implications
here are a double-edged blade. As the market-power model becomes less applicable, the com-
petitive model better describes this seller's market. When such a seller's demand curve flat-
tens out (assume, for example, that a 5% increase in price would eliminate almost all of its
camera customers), the assumption that the seller is not constrained by lack of buyers but by
increasing marginal costs becomes more compelling. In short, this seller will not "lose" an
entire sale because an additional buyer is available at or near the market price.
56. Just as changed or unanticipated economic conditions often cause a party to breach
a contract, unforeseen circumstances often appear to enhance the breach's impact or conse-
quences. These unanticipated or changed circumstances will often appear to affect the seller's
ability to replace the breached contract. Assume that changed circumstances, such as re-
duced production costs, permit Retail Marine to sell more boats profitably than the firm
initially estimated. Subsequently, Neri breaches and the boat is resold to another buyer.
When Retail Marine sues for lost-volume profits, it seems able to support its claim by estab-
lishing that an excess capacity remained after the breach and sale. Because the firm can now
sell additional boats to more buyers, it seems plausible to conclude that the seller has "lost"
the entire profit from the breaching buyer's contract. But this unanticipated additional prof-
itable capacity is completely irrelevant to the calculation of the buyer's damages. Excess
"volume" would have occurred without regard to the breach-performance decision by the
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sales to other buyers are unaffected by breach, a lost-volume claim is
justified because profitable volume then declines by the full amount
of the breach. Conversely, the seller loses no volume if the breach
alters its costs and demand conditions so that supplying other buyers
becomes newly profitable.
The replacement model demonstrates that the buyer's breach in-
creases the profitable volume of additional sales. In other words, a
seller will not have the capacity to proftlab'y supply all of the
breached quantity in addition to its existing sales. In fact, perform-
ance by the buyer would make some existing sales unprofitable.
When a seller operates in a competitive market, it will always have
more available buyers than it can profitably supply; therefore, addi-
tional sales will always make up for any breached volume. The com-
petitive seller will always sell the same number of goods, regardless of
breach. A seller with market power has a limited number of buyers
willing to purchase at its profit-maximizing price. Although this
seller could conceivably lower its price and discover new buyers,
price cutting reduces revenues and effectively restrains the seller from
capturing additional buyers at lower prices. Indeed, such a seller has
"lost" a sale. Nevertheless, the seller has not lost the entire profit
which that sale would have earned. By refusing the goods, the de-
faulting buyer no longer can resell them and thus diminish the
seller's pool of potential buyers. The breach, by removing the risk
buyer. Had the buyer performed and resold the unwanted goods, it would ideally have cap-
tured one of the seller's resale purchases, leaving the seller with the same post-breach capac-
ity. Indeed, a commercially reasonable seller will simply expand output and sell more. The
situation resulting from the breach is unchanged.
Assume, for example, the pristine conditions reflected in Figure 2B of the replacement
model, where the buyer's breach permits the seller to recapture an entire additional resale
purchaser. If the buyer accepts delivery and then resells to a potential customer of the seller,
the seller has the identical volume as it would have after breach. Because contract damages
only guarantee the non-breacher a position equal to that of full performance, in measuring
damages courts should consider only conditions attributable to the breach.
This analysis does not imply that changed conditions never affect the calculation of the
seller's damages. If the opportunity to exploit the changed circumstance is directly attributa-
ble to the breach, any resulting gains are properly credited against the damage award. As we
observed in Figure 1, in the typical case where the repudiated quantity of B units is less than
or equal to the post-breach volume Q, courts should not credit savings in operating costs
brought about by a reduction in output against the damages owed to the seller. But if the
contract calls for a quantity of goods which exceeds the profitable post-breach volume, the
buyer is entitled to a credit for the net cost savings caused by the reduction in output. The
different results are easily explained. Only in the unusual case in which contract units exceed
the adjusted output are the "expenses saved in consequence of the buyer's breach." See
U.C.C. §§ 2-706, -708(1). Any time the seller can adjust output to meet changed conditions,
it can achieve cost savings without regard to the breached contract.
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that the seller may lose one of its limited noncontractual buyers, per-
mits some expansion in the seller's market for additional sales.
Additionally, whenever the seller's production costs increase with
additional sales, the buyer's breach also enables the seller to save
costs on future noncontractual sales. Reduced marginal costs for
other units of production lead to a further expansion in profitable
output. But marginal costs for many sellers may be constant over
wide ranges in output; thus the cost effect of a given breach is always
an empirical question. Examining cost and demand conditions dem-
onstrates that awarding sellers complete lost-volume profit recoveries
is likely to overcompensate them.57 In order to mirror true losses, the
new profits made possible by replacement must always offset the
seller's lost-profit claims.5
B. Legal Implications of the Replacement Model
Information about the extent of replacement is necessary for pre-
cise damage measurement. Accurately measuring those profits re-
captured by a given breach requires information concerning the
presence of other sellers in the market, the extent of the resale risk,
and the nature of the seller's cost and market conditions. Obtaining
much of this information is extremely costly. Indeed, a crucial ele-
ment in the calculus-the resale risk and its probable impact on the
seller's market-may be totally inaccessible.
59
Although information costs prohibit accurate measurement of
true losses, the preceding analysis suggests that the common law pre-
sumption of total replacement is not demonstrably less accurate in
57. The probability of overcompensation can also depend on the nature of the seller's
production. Where the seller engages in sales of discrete units of equal value-widgets, for
example-a breach of one unit will produce either total replacement or no replacement, since
partial expansion is impossible. Yet this situation should occur only rarely. Even in the Nei"
case, for example, the sale of a single boat does not eliminate the possibility of a partial
expansion of profitable output through increased sales in related, less-costly marine
equipment.
58. See text accompanying note 47 supra. The reader is also invited to explore the inter-
mediate cases by redrawing Figures 2A and 2B with greater or lesser slopes to the marginal
cost and marginal revenue curves. Note that the slope of these curves has significance only in
the relevant range neighboring their intersection point; the shape and position of the remain-
der of these curves does not affect the results.
59. Although changes in marginal costs are accessible through certain kinds of cost ac-
counting systems, see text accompanying notes 101-04 infra, evidence of the seller's market
and any breach-related changes in demand present particularly intractable proof problems.
Establishing the effect of breach on the seller's market requires data describing the market for
both new and used goods and the seller's relative market position. It seems implausible that
the costs of acquiring this information in individual cases would be justified by any corre-
sponding increase in accuracy.
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assessing damages than the lost-volume presumption of no replace-
ment for the "lost" sale. Absent empirical data, assumptions about
typical cost and demand conditions necessarily limit judgments. It is
initially tempting to urge that neither the lost-volume nor common
law presumption is a useful rule for decision in view of their likely
inaccuracy in any specific circumstances. Nevertheless, the extraor-
dinarily high direct costs of proving true losses, and the uncertainty
that error spawns, argue strongly for a legal presumption that guides
results in the absence of rebutting evidence.
Examining the lost-volume litigation provides some basis for pro-
posing a decision rule that will minimize enforcement costs. Cases
raising lost-volume claims fall into three broad categories based on
the markets in which the breach occurred. The first two catego-
ries-sales in commercial and commodities markets-raise strong
factual parallels with the market-power and competitive models.
Our analysis suggests that a presumption of replacement in cases
arising under these market conditions will minimize enforcement
costs. In the third category-the retail automobile market-factual
circumstances make it difficult to construct efficient damage rules.
The lost-volume disputes arising under U.C.C. § 2-708(2) have
been over commercial contracts between manufacturers, wholesalers,
and retailers.' Typically, sellers in these cases have contracted to sell
relatively large quantities of designated goods. After breach, they
resell the goods to other commercial buyers and claim lost profits on
the breached contract. A market-power model implying substantial
replacement by resale most aptly describes the markets in which
these contracts are made. Since many of these commercial markets
have fewer and larger sellers than retail markets, each seller presuma-
bly has greater power to affect the price at which its goods are sold.
In addition, the buyer's ready access to the wholesale market suggests
that had it not breached the buyer would have been able to accept
unwanted goods and resell them. These factors make it more likely
that the seller will substantially replace the breached contract. 6' The
pattern of facts in commercial lost-volume cases is consistent with the
60. E.g., Famous Knitwear Corp. v. Drug Fair, Inc., 493 F.2d 251 (4th Cir. 1974)
(wholesale sweaters); Distribu-Dor, Inc. v. Karadanis, 11 Cal. App. 3d 463, 90 Cal. Rptr. 231
(3d Dist. 1970) (bathroom fixtures); Snyder v. Herbert Greenbaum & Assocs., 38 Md. App.
144, 380 A.2d 618 (Ct. Spec. 1977) (wholesale carpeting); Neri v. Retail Marine Corp., 30
N.Y.2d 393, 285 N.E.2d 311, 334 N.Y.S.2d 165 (1972) (commercial boat).
61. In addition, many commercial sellers probably operate under conditions of increas-
ing marginal costs, which would expand post-breach productive opportunities even more. See
text accompanying notes 46-47 supra.
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theoretical model suggesting substantial replacement. This supports
the hypothesis that, absent rebutting data, a contract-market formu-
la including incidental expenses6 2 will more accurately approximate
the seller's loss.
Contract disputes in the commodities market constitute a second
category of cases where damage rules have been extensively litigated.
In virtually every case, the court has adopted a contract-market
formula.63 The factual coincidence between these markets and the
competitive model developed above justifies and explains this result.
Sellers in commodities markets are the closest real-world examples of
the archetypal "price taker" of pure competition. Since there are
always ample buyers at the market price, an additional purchaser for
the contracted goods will always appear. The only practical restraint
on the output of commodity market sellers is the increasing cost of
additional production and sales. Unless the buyer breached, the
seller would not seek the additional "replacement" buyer because the
seller would have incurred a loss in supplying the additional quanti-
ty.6 4 These market conditions provide even stronger support than
those in the commercial markets for an initial presumption that a
resale replaces the breached contract. The contract-market differen-
62. Both of the Code's market-damages mechanisms, § 2-706 and § 2-708(1), include
recovery for incidental damages as provided in § 2-710.
Section 2-710 authorizes an award of incidental damages for costs "incurred in. . . [the]
care and custody of goods after the buyer's breach, in connection with return or resale of the
goods or otherwise resulting from the breach." This provision would clearly cover the costs of
searching for and negotiating any additional replacement sales made profitable by the
breach.
63. (1) Code cases: In re Augustin Bros., 460 F.2d 376 (8th Cir. 1972) (corn); Desbien v.
Penokee Farmers Union Coop. Ass'n, 220 Kan. 358, 552 P.2d 917 (1976) (wheat); Procter &
Gamble Distrib. Co. v. Lawrence Am. Field Warehousing Corp., 16 N.Y.2d 344, 213 N.E.2d
873, 266 N.Y.S.2d 785 (1965) (soybean oil).
(2) Pre-Code Cases: Renner Co. v. McNeff Bros., 102 F.2d 664 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 308
U.S. 576 (1939) (hops); Schaefer v. United States, 59 Ct. Cl. 134 (1924) (oats); Rice v.
Schmid, 18 Cal. 2d 382, 115 P.2d 498 (1941) (flour); Abercrombie v. Georgia Distrib. Co., 39
Ga. App. 654, 148 S.E. 296 (1929) (cottonseed meals); Sorrells & Co. v. Ancona Co., 250
Mass. 381, 145 N.E. 564 (1924) (cotton); Pierson-Lathrop Grain Co. v. Britton, 195 Mo. App.
26, 189 S.W. 584 (1916) (corn); Fahey v. Updike Elevator Co., 103 Neb. 245, 171 N.W. 50
(1919) (wheat and corn); R.W. Rounsavall & Co. v. H. Herstein Seed Co., 25 N.M. 626, 186
P. 1078 (1920) (beans); Clark v. Merriam & Millard Co., 223 S.W. 869 (Tex. Civ. App. 1920)
(oats).
64. When the additional or marginal costs of soliciting and supplying an additional
buyer exceed the additional revenues from that sale, the rational seller will sell no further
goods. In a competitive market the marginal revenues for each additional sale are the same
since the market price is "taken" by an individual firm. Thus the only reason that such firms
would not supply all the buyers is that at some point the costs of making additional sales
exceed the added revenues. See text accompanying notes 28-30 supira.
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tial plus the incidental costs of searching for and negotiating the re-
sale contract best measure the seller's losses.
Contracts involving commercial and commodities markets closely
approximate the replacement model's polar cases of substantial mar-
ket power and competition. A replacement presumption would
therefore seem the more efficient response to the problem of measur-
ing true loss. But the possibility of replacement is less predictable in
the final litigation category-lost-volume claims raised by retail au-
tomobile sellers. Although automobile retailers have not litigated
any lost-volume claims for over 20 years, this market deserves careful
analysis because it illustrates conditions in which the prospects of re-
placement seem much smaller. Fixed price policies traditionally lim-
ited the dealer's flexibility in adjusting prices.65 Further, automobile
markets are frequently locational monopolies with few buyers at any
given price; additionally, sellers face little competition from reselling
buyers because the "lemon effect" severely depresses the auto resale
market.66 Finally, most sales are in single units of goods with rela-
tively equivalent values; therefore, the seller either replaces com-
pletely or not at all.
Because of these special hybrid characteristics, in this third cate-
gory we must carefully examine specific facts before predicting
whether the car contracted for is sold to a new buyer who would not
otherwise have purchased from the seller. The majority of automo-
bile cases, all decided under the "available market" limitation of the
pre-Code rule, have limited the seller to market damages, although
in a number of instances the courts have found "special circum-
stances" justifying a lost-volume recovery.67
65. Two observations reinforce this assertion: (1) No retail lost-volume cases have been
litigated under the U.C.C. Indeed, in the only automobile litigation under the U.C.C. the
seller limited its claim to the difference between resale and contract prices under § 2-706, plus
incidental damages under § 2-710. Lee Oldsmobile, Inc. v. Kaiden, 32 Md. App. 556, 363
A.2d 270 (Ct. Spec. App. 1976). (2) In England, where fixed price regulation remains, the
retail sellers association remains active in litigating such cases in order to preserve the lost-
volume presumption. See, e.g., W. L. Thompson Ltd. v. Robinson (Gunmakers) Ltd., [1955] 1
Ch. 177; Interoffice Telephones Ltd. v. Robert Freeman Co., [1958] 1 Q.B. 190; Robophone
Facilities Ltd. v. Blank, [1966] 1 W.L.R. 1428.
66. Because automobiles are complex and expensive products, any resale shortly after
purchase generates a significant discount because potential purchasers assume a high risk of a
"lemon".
67. Automobile cases denying lost-profit damages include: Ford Motor Co. v. Fry, 203
Ill. App. 46 (1916); Chalmers Motor Co. v. Maibaum, 186 I1. App. 147 (1914); Mossy Motors
v. McRedmond, 12 So. 2d 719 (La. Ct. App. 1943); Charles St. Garage Co. v. Kaplan, 312
Mass. 624, 45 N.E.2d 928 (1942); A. Lenobel, Inc. v. Senif, 252 A.D. 533, 300 N.Y.S. 226
(1937), modtled, 253 A.D. 813, 1 N.Y.S.2d 1022 (1938); Babbitt v. Wides Motor Sales Corp.,
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Clearly, in any particular case exhibiting these hybrid character-
istics the actual amount of replacement is an empirical question. But
the evidence suggesting that cases generally tend to cluster toward
the poles represented in the replacement model supports a presump-
tion of replacement in all cases. Classifying hybrid markets ex ante is
costly. For example, some automobile retailers may operate in high-
ly competitive markets, while others may enjoy substantial market
power. The litigation costs of a more precise rule may well exceed
any gain in accuracy. A generally applied replacement rule operates
efficiently if sellers in uncharacteristic markets can rebut the pre-
sumption by offering evidence that market conditions diminish the
probability of replacement.68
Of course, some sellers may still be unable efficiently to establish
an alternative inference of lost volume. However, no seller is re-
quired to bear the risk of erroneous measurement. Any or all of the
risks of breach can be reassigned by stipulating to damages or pre-
sumptions. By allocating the property rights initially, a replacement
presumption clarifies the relevant issues for subsequent bargaining.
69
17 Misc. 2d 889, 192 N.Y.S.2d 21 (App. Term 1959); Lowas Garage Co. v. Scheer, 199 N.Y.S.
748 (App. Term 1923); Genovese v. A. Lenobel, Inc., 148 Misc. 548, 265 N.Y.S. 338 (Mun.
Ct. 1933); Gilmore v. Battles, 193 Okla. 396, 144 P.2d 114 (1943); Schuenemann v. John G.
Wallaeger Co., 170 Wis. 616, 176 N.W. 59 (1920).
Automobile cases granting lost profits because of "special circumstances" include: Dolly
Parker Motors, Inc. v. Stinson, 220 Ark. 28, 245 S.W.2d 820 (1952); Torkomian v. Russell, 90
Conn. 481, 97 A. 760 (1916); Stewart v. Hansen, 62 Utah 281, 218 P. 959 (1923); Smead v.
Sutherland, 118 Vt. 361, 111 A.2d 335 (1955); Breding v. Champlain Marine & Realty Co.,
106 Vt. 288, 172 A. 625 (1934); Popp v. Yuenger, 229 Wis. 189, 282 N.W. 55 (1938).
68. The ultimate question for a factfinder in such a case would be whether it is more
probable than not that the seller replaced the breached contract. The kinds of informal proof
that might be regarded as sufficient to support alternative inferences might include market
conditions characterized by several sellers operating within overlapping sales areas, or evi-
dence that the breaching buyer was isolated from the main market. Thus, for example, the
existence of competition might well diffuse the risk that a buyer would decide to take the
goods and "pollute" the seller's market. Alternatively, the presumption of replacement may
be rebutted by evidence that if the buyer had taken delivery it would find resale in the market
very difficult because selling the goods required special skills or service capabilities.
69. Because of the difficulty and uncertainty of establishing true losses, an agreed rem-
edy provision in which the buyer assumes the risk of lost-profit damages upon breach would
be valid and enforceable. See Goetz & Scott, supra note 1, at 559-60. Furthermore, no com-
pelling rationale denies the parties the freedom-to shift only the presumption itself from the
seller to the buyer. For example, the agreement might provide that the buyer bear the risk of
uncertainty and error in the form of a rebuttable presumption of lost volume. See Lea &
Walker, Ejicient Procedure at 7-12 (forthcoming paper). One objection to the freedom of indi-
vidual litigators to rearrange the procedural mechanism to accommodate substantive alloca-
tions of risk is the possibility that adjudication may not achieve "truth" in an absolute sense.
But if the goal of procedure is not abstract truth, but only accuracy or "justice" based on the
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The rule is an efficient assignment where it specifies results that most
parties would reach absent bargaining costs. This gain in analytical
clarity should not be lightly dismissed.7" It is tempting to observe
that parties can always buy out of an inefficient legal rule, and if
transaction costs are low the social effects of an inefficient rule are
therefore minimal. If the parties do not contract around the legal
rule, is that not a fair expression of their satisfaction with the normal
outcomes? Yet the complexity of the lost-volume problem suggests
that the information costs of exposing an overcompensatory rule are
relatively high. Indeed, insofar as the lost-volume presumption seems
presently to be overcompensating the seller, it is likely that the reason
it does so is that the parties themselves do not perceive the overcom-
pensatory effects.
An analysis of the three markets in which lost-volume cases are
litigated supports the assumption that the market-damages formula
is more accurate than most commentators have thought. In addi-
tion, this market analysis suggests a stronger assumption: When the
seller can dipose of its goods on the market, overall eftieng zs best achieved by
presuming that the seller zs able to fully replace the breached contract.
A replacement presumption fits neatly into the U.C.C. damages
scheme. 71 This damage rule would limit the volume seller to con-
tract-market and incidental damages unless rebutted by evidence
that a combination of market and production circumstances prevents
the breach from allowing profitable expansion.72 Because of the high
parties' subjective perceptions, such individual procedural autonomy is perfectly appropriate.
See Thibault & Walker, A Theog of Procedure, 66 CALIF. L. REV. 541, 543-45 (1978).
70. The one case where the replacement effect of the buyer's breach was argued pro-
vides a useful example. In A. Lenobel, Inc. v. Senif, 252 A.D. 533, 300 N.Y.S. 226 (1937),
modified, 253 A.D. 813, 1 N.Y.S.2d 1022 (1938), the court rejected an automobile dealer's lost-
volume claim in the following terms: "The plaintiffsays [a market formula] leaves it remedi-
less; that on the resale to replace the defendant it depleted its number of prospects to the
extent of one. . . .This contention is specious. If the buyer had in efct assigned his contract ofpurchase
by taking a delivery and immediately selling to another in the same area, and had thus abandoned his purpose
to get a new car for himself, a depletion of prospects to the same degree would have occurred, and but one
conmission would have inured to 1he plaintijf.' Id. at 535 n.36, 300 N.Y.S. at 229 n.36 (emphasis
added).
71. Section 2-708(2) explains when market damages are inappropriate: "If the [market
damages] measure. . . is inadequate to put the seller in as good a position as performance
would have done then the measure of damages is the profit. . . which the seller would have
made. .. ."
The language of § 2-708(2) is undiscriminating, giving no guidance for when the com-
pensation principle requires lost profits. The replacement presumption would retain, absent
rebutting evidence, a market formula for all cases in which the goods have an available resale
market.
72. See notes 51-55, 68 supra and accompanying text.
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cost of more precise data, courts should allow informal proof of mar-
ket conditions that imply low replacement probabilities. For exam-
ple, the seller should be able to rebut the replacement presumption
when, in a noncompetitive market, it could show that the breaching
buyer was isolated from the seller's main market.73 The seller who
sustains this burden is entitled to "lost-volume" profits for the entire
breached contract.
74
By reducing the enforcement costs of a seller's damage measures,
a replacement presumption minimizes other inefficient effects of
broadly conceived lost-profit damages. We observed earlier that a
buyer's decision to breach rather than to accept delivery and dispose
of the goods represents a determination that the seller enjoys a com-
parative advantage in reselling the unwanted goods. The buyer is in
the best position to make the efficient choice, since it can more
cheaply compare its selling costs with those of the seller. Undis-
criminating endorsement of lost-volume claims systematically
overcompensates the seller, inducing inefficient "no breach" deci-
sions by the buyer.75 Economic analysis suggests that a replacement
presumption will minimize deviations from the compensation princi-
ple and will encourage efficient breach behavior.76 When the goods
have no established market, only specialized damage alternatives are
available. In Part II we examine the accuracy of conventional mea-
surement of lost profits by developing a model for measuring true
losses when the seller's damages can be established only by proof of
the changes in revenues and costs produced by the breach.
73. For example, this might be true of incidental purchasers, foreign buyers, and buyers
of merchandise that could be sold only if the seller had special expertise or the capacity to
provide service.
74. Even when the presumption is regarded as successfully rebutted and lost-volume
damages awarded, the true losses will be less than the entire estimated profit on the breached
unit. Only if the buyer faces absolute barriers to market entry and the seller confronts con-
stant marginal costs will a lost-volume presumption measure the seller's loss accurately.
75. Overcompensation induces the buyer that would otherwise breach to accept deliv-
ery and resell the unwanted goods in order to avoid the "punitive" damage award. Since the
seller often can dispose of the goods more efficiently, the lost-volume presumption may im-
pede the parties' ability to minimize breach costs.
76. A damage rule which systematically deviates from the compensation principle has
several inefficient effects. Overcompensating the volume seller discourages efficient breach
decisions because additional transaction costs are imposed on the buyer contemplating
breach. Alternatively, erroneously compensating the salvaging seller when it discontinues
performance will either insufficiently restrain breach or reduce the seller's incentives to miti-
gate the consequences of breach. See text accompanying notes 77-82 in/a.
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II. MEASURING DAMAGES WHERE THE SELLER SALVAGES AN
INCOMPLETE PERFORMANCE
A. Redefining the "Components Seller"
1. The primay of market damages where markets are available.
In addition to the lost-volume problem, a second concern about
the accuracy of market damages has animated the debate about lost-
profit awards. Assume that the breach occurs before the seller has
completed performance. Section 2-704(2) of the U.C.C. dictates that
the seller use "reasonable commercial judgment" in deciding
whether to complete performance and attempt a resale or to termi-
nate production and salvage the breached contract."7 What measure
of damages is appropriate when the seller chooses to salvage its com-
ponents of production? Most commentators suggest that market
damages will grossly distort the true losses sustained by a "compo-
nents seller." Since performance has been terminated, the contract-
market formula bears no rational relationship to either the seller's
contemplated or actual investment in the contract. Thus, it is ar-
gued, compensation requires a lost-profits award based on the differ-
ence between the contract price and the estimated costs of
production.78
In reality, however, if a market for the goods is available the con-
tract-market formula will accurately measure the salvaging seller's
losses. Assume the buyer breaches a contract at $100 because the
market price has declined to $50. The seller claims damages based
on the $50 price difference. The buyer objects, arguing that it would
have cost the seller $80-a sum exceeding the prevailing market
price-to produce the contract goods. Thus, the buyer contends that
damages are properly limited to the $20 expected profit on the
breached contract. But the buyer's argument does not isolate the
relevant issue. As most common law courts recognized, the contract-
market formula is an entirely appropriate mechanism for measuring
this seller's losses.
79
77. The seller's choices are formally embodied in U.C.C. § 2-704(2); after breach the
seller must use reasonable commercial judgment in deciding whether to complete manufac-
ture and resell the completed goods or terminate unfinished performance and resell for scrap
or salvage. See note 9 supra. The choice is properly based on the cx ante circumstances known
to the seller.
78. See note 10 supra.
79. Roehm v. Horst, 178 U.S. 1 (1900); Rice v. Schmid, 18 Cal. 2d 382, 115 P.2d 498
(1941); Varley v. Belford, 156 N.Y.S. 597 (Sup. Ct. 1916); Spencer Kellog & Sons v. Provi-
dence Churning Co., 45 R.I. 180, 121 A. 123 (1923); C. MCCORMICK, siupra note 2, § 173, at
659. In an action for breach of contract to purchase coconut oil, the court in Kellog held that
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The existence of a market in which the seller can acquire the con-
tract goods is the central criterion for retaining a market formula,
even though the buyer breaches before completion. If the seller can
transform its costs into the current market value by purchasing
equivalent goods on the market, its internal costs become irrelevant
once the market falls below them. Permitting the seller to recover
the $50 market damages even though its internal production costs
would have exceeded the market price merely confirms the risk allo-
cation resulting from a fixed-price contract for future performance.
The executory contract is an exchange of risks: The seller purchases
the chance that the market will decline and sells the chance that the
market will rise. The seller has bargained for the opportunity,
unimpaired by the buyer's breach, to exploit a declining market. 80
the cost of production was immaterial, since the seller could always go out and buy goods on
the market to fill the contract.
Different considerations control when the seller is bound by its contract to acquire the
components from a specific source. Several pre-Code cases involved sellers required to furnish
coal from specific mines. After the buyer's breach the seller received as damages the differ-
ence between the contract price and the current market price of the coal, even though the
acquisition costs from the specific sources were higher than the market price. See United
States v. Burton Coal Co., 273 U.S. 337 (1927); Garfield & Proctor Coal Co. v. New York,
N.H. & H.R.R., 248 Mass. 502, 143 N.E. 312 (1924). Although these decisions confirm the
traditional preference for market damages, the damage awards were inaccurate. In each case
the true loss was the difference between the seller's own cost of acquiring coal and the con-
tract price-a lost-profits measure. A contract mandating a specified source is in essence a
contract for special-order goods, in which the seller has no market opportunities to exploit. In
terms of the distinction drawn in this article "no available market" could be established for
coal at an acquisition price below estimated costs.
The accuracy of market damages in this context has only been challenged once under the
Code. In Jagger Bros. v. Technical Textile Co., 202 Pa. Super. Ct. 639, 198 A.2d 888 (1964),
the buyer repudiated a contract to purchase yarn before the seller-manufacturer had com-
pleted performance. The seller recovered judgment for the full contract-market differential
under U.C.C. § 2-708(1), and on appeal the buyer contended that damages should be limited
to the expected profits (contract price less estimated costs) under § 2-708(2). The court relied
on the common law rule in affirming the market-damages award, emphasizing that the exist-
ence of an available market and proof of the market price were the key criteria for using the
market formula of U.C.C. § 2-708(1).
80. The contract-market formula is the efficient damage rule even where the seller is
unable to exploit the changed market conditions. Assume, for example, that at the time of
breach the seller has already spent $40 toward estimated costs of $80. In the absence of
breach the seller would spend an additional $40 to complete performance and would receive
a profit of $20 ($100 contract price - $80 costs). The seller could not profitably exploit the
declining market because the cost of purchase on the market ($50) plus sunk costs already
expended ($40) exceed its production costs(S80). Market damages of $50 ($100 contract price
- $50 market price) will induce the seller to complete performance and sell the goods on the
market to achieve the equivalent of its full performance profit position of $20.
The seller who has partially completed performance will behave efficiently only if it
completes production. The market price ($50) exceeds the remaining production costs of $40
($80 costs - $40 sunk costs). The market-damages formula makes the seller whole by giving it
the $50 needed to achieve the full performance revenue position of $100 only if it completes
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What measure of damages is appropriate where the seller chooses
not to complete performance, despite an available resale market, and
the post-breach market price exceeds estimated costs? Here the seller
would prefer expected profits (contract price less estimated costs), ar-
guing that market damages will undercompensate for the breach
since performance would have earned the estimated profits. In order
to ensure mitigation, however, the damage rule must induce comple-
tion whenever the expected price exceeds the estimated costs of pro-
duction. Only the contract-market formula will induce the seller to
minimize costs.8 ' This analysis supports those common law decisions
limiting such sellers to market damages whenever a profitable resale
market appeared available.82
In sum, careful analysis suggests that the conventional "compo-
nents seller" is an overinclusive category. Whenever there is a mar-
ket for the contract goods, market damages will accurately measure
the salvaging seller's losses. The problem with an overly broad "com-
ponents" classification is not merely that some sellers may be using a
damage formula which entails difficult and costly proof. More im-
portantly, the conventional analysis mistakenly suggests that in
many cases of incomplete performance the seller's true loss is equal to
its expected profits as measured by the contract price less estimated
production and sells the goods on the market. A rule that allowed the seller to abandon
performance and recover out of pocket expenses ($40) plus lost profits ($20) would be ineffi-
cient because it would make the seller whole without inducing mitigation of damages.
81. Using a market formula will not eliminate the importance of careful proof of the
appropriate "market price." For example, assume there are two markets-a wholesale mar-
ket in which the seller buys and a retail market in which it sells and in which the contract was
made. Under U.C.C. § 2-708(l) the seller should recover the difference between the contract
price and the wholesale market price at the time of the breach. Admittedly the market
formula is merely a mechanism for recovering the seller's actual profits. But conventional
lost-profit analysis errs not only in urging that this loss be established by more costly direct
proof; it further holds that the proper quantum of loss is the expected profit, the difference
between the contract price and estimated production costs, rather than the actual profit, con-
tract price less wholesale market price, that performance would have earned.
82. W.R. Grace & Co. v. Nagle, 275 F. 343 (2d Cir. 1921); Kincaid v. Price, 18 Colo.
App. 73, 70 P. 153 (1902); Garfield & Proctor Coal Co. v. New York, N.H. & H.R.R., 248
Mass. 502, 143 N.E. 312 (1924). If the seller recovers lost profits when expected market price
exceeds estimated costs, there is no incentive to complete manufacture even though resale is
profitable. The only way to induce efficient post-breach decisions is to retain market damages
as the prima facie measure whenever an available resale market exists. But since the seller
must make the completion/salvage choice ex ante, in some cases the expost market price may
unexpectedly exceed estimated costs. Therefore, the availability of a profitable resale market
must be determined at the time of repudiation. A rule permitting the larger recovery would
be appropriate only when the seller can show (1) that viewed ex ante the decision to salvage
reduced expected breach costs; and (2) that true losses exceeded the contract-market formula.
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costs of production, rather than the actual profit as revealed by the
contract-market formula.
2. Lost-profit damages: the seller of special-order goods.
The absence of an available market for the contract goods is the
crucial factor signalling the necessity of specialized damage measure-
ment. Assume, for example, that the buyer breaches a special-order
contract before the seller has completed performance. Presumably,
the buyer breaches because it believes that the seller can assess the
salvage-completion choice efficiently and elect the alternative that
minimizes expected breach costs.83 If the seller reasonably elects to
complete the remaining performance, the absence of a market for the
goods entitles it to enforce the contract and recover the full purchase
price from the buyer.84 Alternatively, if the seller chooses to salvage
its pre-breach efforts to produce the special-order goods, only direct
proof of lost profits will measure damages accurately. Since the exist-
ence of a potential replacement market for the contract goods is a
prerequisite to market damages, this "salvage seller"85 is always enti-
tled to establish losses equal to the revenues lost by the breach re-
83. See note 77 supra.
84. See note 37 supra. Under U.C.C. § 2-709(1)(b), the seller may recover the purchase
price of identified goods if it is "unable after reasonable effort to resell them at a reasonable
price or the circumstances reasonably indicate that such effort will be unavailing." A number
of courts have looked at the parallels between the alternative specialized remedies of price or
profit. See, e.g., City of Louisville v. Rockwell Mfg. Co., 482 F.2d 159 (6th Cir. 1973); Detroit
Power Screwdriver Co. v. Ladney, 25 Mich. App. 478, 181 N.W.2d 828 (1970); Timber Access
Indus. Co. v. U.S. Plywood-Champion Papers, Inc., 263 Or. 509, 503 P.2d 482 (1972).
It is important to distinguish carefully the salvage and completion situations because
typically they will produce different market assumptions. Once the goods have been completed,
their specialized nature suggests that no market is available. This would also indicate that
only one or a very few buyers would want them. In that case, the market might be monop-
sonistic or oligopsonistic-both buyer and seller would have market power. Here the solution
to the parties' post-breach bargaining is indeterminate. See note 34 supra. However, in the
lost-profit situation considered in this paper the goods are not completed, and pre-breach
efforts are salvaged. Thus, there will typically be a competitive demand for the seller's pro-
ductive output.
85. This "salvaging" seller of special-order goods should be distinguished from the con-
ventionally drawn categories of 'jobbers" or "components" manufacturers of goods with an
available market. Even though the breach causes the seller to terminate an incomplete per-
formance, the fact of salvage alone is insufficient to signal an award based on estimated prof-
its. The key question is whether the seller can exploit an available market for the contract
goods. Courts have traditionally recognized the logic of this analysis. See, e.g., Anchorage
Centennial Dev. Co. v. Van Wormer & Rodrigues, Inc., 443 P.2d 596 (Alas. 1968); Detroit
Power Screwdriver Co. v. Ladney, 25 Mich. App. 478, 181 N.W.2d 828 (1970); Chicago
Roller Skate Mfg. Co. v. Sokol Mfg. Co., 185 Neb. 515, 177 N.W.2d 25 (1970); Timber Access
Indus. Co. v. U.S. Plywood-Champion Papers, Inc., 263 Or. 509, 503 P.2d 482 (1972).
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duced by any savings in costs.8 6  The inartful and conclusory
language of U.C.C. § 2-708(2) incorporates an equivalent mecha-
nism for measuring lost profits:8 7 Any seller for whom market dam-
ages are inadequate can recover the profit that the buyer's
performance would have earned. Estimated profits are measured by
the contract price less the variable costs incurred in producing the
repudiated goods.88 Estimated profits, however, will rarely represent
the true losses of the salvage seller. Since, by hypothesis, the seller
has not completed performance of the repudiated contract, the
86. This statement can be expressed by a simple arithmetic formula: AP = AR - AC;
where AP, AR, and AC symbolize the changes in profit, revenues, and costs respectively.
87. The lost-profits mechanism in § 2-708(2) provides: "IT]he measure of damages is the
profit (including reasonable overhead) which the seller would have made from full perform-
ance by the buyer, together with any incidental damages provided in this Article (Section 2-
710), due allowance for costs reasonaby incurred and due credit for payments or proceeds of resale." (em-
phasis added). The italicized language was added in 1955 in order to "extend the rule clearly
to the right of repudiation and to clarify the privilege of the seller to realize junk value when
it is manifestly useless to complete the operation of manufacture." UNIFORM COMMERCIAL
CODE: AMENDMENTS APPROVED BY ACTION OF THE AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE AND THE
NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM LAWS 14 (1954). Although the
drafters intended to incorporate damages for the salvaging seller, the formula could no longer
be easily applied to lost-volume cases. Most commentators have suggested that § 2-708(2) be
read selectively in order to permit both "lost-volume" and "components" claims. See J.
WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 6, §§ 7-8 to -10, at 225-29; Harris, RadicalRestatement, supra
note 7, at 96-99; Schlosser, supra note 7.
88. A lost-profits award is not reduced by fixed or overhead costs. The only relevant
deductions from contract revenues are those variable costs that are saved by the breach. Sec-
tion 2-708(2) authorizes the recovery of gross profits through the rather cryptic reference to
"profit (including reasonable overhead)." Thus, the amount of damage caused by the breach
is the difference between contract price and net variable costs that the breach saves. A fixed
cost such as "overhead" is not properly part of the "costs saved" since it would have been
incurred even if the buyer had performed. Traditionally, courts have allowed sellers to ex-
clude these overhead costs. See, e.g., King Features Syndicate v. Courrier, 241 Iowa 870, 43
N.W.2d 718 (1950); Jessup & Moore Paper Co. v. Bryant Paper Co., 297 Pa. 483, 147 A. 519
(1929). But see Wilhelm Lubrication Co. v. Brattrud, 197 Minn. 626, 268 N.W. 634 (1936);
Worrell & Williams v. Kinnear Mfg. Co., 103 Va. 719, 49 S.E. 988 (1905).
Some of the pre-Code cases that deny the seller the right to ignore overhead costs in
estimating gross profits can be explained in terms of a presumption that time and capacity
released by the breach should have enabled the seller to make new contracts that covered the
overhead costs formerly allocated to the breached contract. See Apex Metal Stamping Co. v.
Alexander & Sawyer, Inc., 48 N.J. Super. 476, 138 A.2d 568 (1958); Schubert v. Midwest
Broadcasting Co., 1 Wis. 2d 497, 85 N.W.2d 449 (1957).
There are several recent commentaries on the proper treatment of fixed costs under § 2-
708(2). See Childres & Burgess, supra note 7, at 854-56; Speidel & Clay, supra note 7. Profes-
sor Speidel's thesis, that recovery of revenues charged to fixed costs overcompensates sellers
operating near profit-maximizing output, is flawed in its analysis. However, his conclusion
that conventional profit awards will overcompensate sellers is valid. Like the pre-Code
courts, the article in effect roughly approximates the true losses by limiting recovery of reve-
nues charged to overhead, rather than recognizing that the seller is operating under increas-
ing marginal costs.
STANFORD LAW REVIEW
breach releases productive capacity. Any sunk costs which the seller
incurs and cannot now recoup are, of course, attributable to the
buyer. Conversely, the mitigation principle induces reasonable ef-
forts to salvage unused factors of production. Thus, the seller's recov-
ery under § 2-708(2) is adjusted by the net costs and revenues
attributable to the breached contract.89 Estimated profit reduced by
salvage will equal true losses, however, only when costs are accu-
rately identified and the breach does not produce savings on other
units produced by the seller.
The efficiency of conventional methods of measuring lost profits
can be evaluated by examining the case of American Metal Clima, Inc.
v. Essex Zntemational, Inc.9° The seller (Amax) operated an aluminum
reduction plant producing primary aluminum. Essex, the buyer, was
a manufacturer of aluminum products. The parties contracted for
Amax to supply 225 million pounds of special-order aluminum rods
to Essex between 1968 and 1973. But changed conditions induced
Essex to breach the arrangement, and Amax used the released capac-
ity to produce 225 million T-ingots of aluminum, subsequently sell-
ing them to non-contractual buyers.
The court granted Amax its lost profits and, citing U.C.C. § 2-
708(2), measured the seller's losses as follows.9' The contract price of
the 225 million pounds of aluminum rods was 25 cents per pound.
The average cost of producing aluminum rods was 17 cents per
pound, 15.5 cents of which was for molten metal. Despite Essex's
objections to the seller's cost accounting evidence, the court con-
cluded that Amax would have earned approximately 8 cents per
pound for a total profit of $18 million. The average cost of produc-
ing T-ingots in 1968 was 16 cents per pound, and their selling price
during this period was 22 cents. Therefore, the court concluded that
sales of 225 million T-ingots would yield profits of $14 million. De-
ducting the net proceeds of the "salvage" from the estimated profits
on the breached contract produced a damage award of $4 million.
Without more complete production data, it is impossible to assess
the accuracy of the court's damage award in American Metal. How-
ever, if the seller's marginal costs of production were increasing at
breach, the profit lost on the Essex contract would be smaller than
89. Rather than the simple way of measuring lost profit--subtracting costs saved (esti-
mated variable costs less variable costs actually incurred) from lost revenue (contract price less
the proceeds of any salvage), § 2-708(2) uses an alternative formula for reaching the same
results: Lostprofit = (contract price - estimated variable costs on breached contract) + (varia-
ble costs actually incurred) - (additional revenues from salvage).
90. 16 U.C.C. REP. SERV. 101 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).
91. The figures have been simplified slightly to reduce the complexity of the illustration.
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estimated average profits for all units produced. More important,
when marginal costs are increasing, the breach would generate "hid-
den" savings on other units produced by Amax. The conventional
profit measurement the court used in American Metal fails to identify
these savings explicitly. Rather, a buyer such as Essex is only
credited with net savings on contract units sold on the spot market in
an effort to salvage the breached contract. In order to evaluate the
efficiency of standard profit measures, we develop below a model in a
costless environment to identify true losses sustained by sellers facing
these conditions.
B. A Modelfor Eftient Measurement of Lost Profits
The conditions supporting a decision to salvage a contract for
specialized goods do not generally exist in competitive markets. The
production of specialized goods for which few buyers exist at any
price is the most common reason for a decision to salvage a breached
contract. Sellers who salvage such special-order goods commonly
possess market power. These sellers may or may not also have in-
creasing marginal production costs.92 The model developed below
explores the implications of these assumptions.
1. Establishing true losses by marginal costs.
Although not identical in its factual assumptions, Figure 3 is
drawn to illustrate the general class of cases represented by the
Amax-Essex contract. Assume now that Amax has special-order con-
tracts with Essex to supply 225 million pounds of aluminum rods at
$.35/pound. Amax also sells aluminum T-ingots to others on the
spot market. The seller has market power and increasing marginal
costs. As Figures 3A and 3B are drawn, variable costs for the base
raw material begin at 15.5 cents for the first unit produced and in-
crease on later units sold.9 3
Figure 3A depicts Amax's production after concluding its con-
tract with Essex. The Essex contract is a fixed obligation. In addi-
tion, Amax will sell other aluminum products on the open market at
92. We cannot generalize, however, because the technological conditions that increase
marginal costs do not have any predictable relationship to the business categories frequently
discussed in legal commentaries, such as special-order producers and makers of standardized
goods. Marginal costs are most likely to increase when important productive inputs are rela-
tively fixed and not subject to easy adjustment as output increases. Cost conditions must be
determined rather than presumed.
93. Conditions such as limited inventory capacity, increasing labor costs, and limited




Profits on Fixed -
Contract with Essex
FIGURE 3B
the profit-maximizing intersection of its marginal revenues and mar-
ginal costs. 94 In Figure 3A the noncontractual output is 225 million
pounds, and total aluminum sales are 450 million pounds. The true
expected profit on the Essex contract is represented in Figure 3A by
the shaded area A between marginal revenues and marginal costs.
The shaded area B represents the expected profit on noncontractual
sales.95
Cost savings produced by the breach are the second component
of a lost-profits award. Figure 3B reflects the changed circumstances
produced by the Essex breach. Amax still projects the same spot mar-
94. As shown in Figures 3A and 3B, spot buyers may not value the first unit produced in
the spot market as highly as the contract buyer values the last unit produced under the spe-
cial-order contract. This difference in value could be due to a change in conditions following
the completion of the contract or to some special value attached to contractual agreements for
production.
95. Expected profit from noncontractual sales is representable alternatively as the area
between the price and the marginal cost curve or the area between the marginal revenue and
marginal cost curves. Shaded area B, which corresponds to the latter alternative, is used to
represent the expected profit for noncontractual sales in Figures 3A and 3B.
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ket demand curve and, by definition, the same marginal revenue
curve. Unlike the volume seller whose demand curve shifts right-
ward when the risk of buyer resale is eliminated, the salvage seller
does not face a shift in its demand curve because there is no alterna-
tive market for the goods.96 However, the seller's marginal cost curve
(MC) has changed significantly. The breach has relieved Amax of
the responsibility of producing the 225 million pounds of aluminum
rods under fixed contract to Essex, thereby enabling Amax to pro-
duce noncontractual units in the lower section of the marginal cost
curve. Because the relevant range of the marginal cost curve for
Amax's output decision has changed,97 the marginal cost curve ap-
pears to have shifted to the right from MC to MCb. What are the
implications of this shift in marginal costs? Had the breach not oc-
curred, Amax would have sold 225 million pounds of T-ingots to
others. Because the firm's marginal costs are increasing, the breach
relieves Amax of the increasing costs previously incurred in produc-
ing contractual units. The marginal cost curve for other units of pro-
duction is therefore lower than if Essex had performed.
Excess profitable capacity is the most visible effect of this change
in costs. If Amax produced only 225 million units after breach, its
marginal costs would be less than marginal revenues. Therefore,
Amax will be willing to lower price on T-ingots to $.28 and produce
an additional 100 million T-ingots so that marginal costs equal mar-
ginal revenues. As the court in American Metal properly concluded,
this adjustment to new opportunities is a salvage of profitable capac-
ity that mitigates the losses produced by the breach. Therefore, the
savings represented by profits earned on new sales (as represented by
the shaded area C in Figure 3B) must offset the lost profits claimed
on the breached contract.9"
96. Since, by definition, there is no established resale market for the contract goods, the
seller does not discount its estimation of the market for sales of related products by the possi-
bility that the buyer will resell in its market. There is no risk that the buyer will resell and
deprive the seller of a sale it would otherwise have made. Thus, the breach does not permit
the seller to increase its market for additional sales and has no effect on the demand curve in
Figure 3A.
Although the assumption of no resale market is true by hypothesis, it seems implausible
that the contract goods are not substitutes at any price for the related products sold to others.
In some circumstances the legal conclusion of "no available market" will not be supported
precisely by unchanged demand for the seller's related products. We assume, nevertheless,
that the costs of identifying small shifts in demand exceed any gains in accurate damage
measurement.
97. See note 41 supra.
98. Part of the profits from the new units produced after the breach must be reattrib-
uted to old units made less profitable by the price reduction caused by the post-breach in-
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The change in costs also generates additional profits on T-ingot
sales projected before the breach. The breach reduces projected mar-
ginal costs on these units and increases their profitability (as repre-
sented by the shaded area D in Figure 3B). These additional breach-
related profits are not accompanied by any observable adjustment by
the seller to the changed conditions. In order to mirror true losses,
however, seller's damages must further be reduced by these "hidden"
cost savings on those other units whose production was projected
prior to breach.
In sum, savings attributable to the breach are not limited to prof-
its on new sales. Before a breach, a seller facing increasing marginal
costs would presumably devote some of its most efficient productive
capacity to the broken contract. 99 By releasing some of this capacity,
the breach produces cost savings for other productive uses. The seller
will sell to some additional buyers to whom it would not have sold in
the absence of breach. In addition, this post-breach adjustment will
result in savings through increased profits on sales from pre-breach
capacity.'0 0 Measuring lost profits by marginal costs permits identifi-
cation of the units affected by breach and accurate measurement of
the corresponding losses and savings. The relationship of average
cost data (such as that apparently used by the American Metal court)
to profits earned on any specific units of production only approxi-
mates true losses. Nevertheless, as we suggest below, the increased
accuracy of marginal cost measurement may be offset in many cases
by the additional costs of obtaining the information.
crease in output. After subtracting these profits, the new profit on the additional units
produced is the shaded area C, the area between the marginal revenue and marginal cost
curves. This is true because the marginal revenue curve reflects the effect of the necessary
price cuts as additional sales are made.
99. Although the representation in the Figures may seem to suggest that the contractual
units are produced "first," this is a decisionmaking priority rather than a temporal one. In
decisions about output expansion, the order of consideration is determined by the profitabil-
ity of the units. Under the factual conditions of the seller's breach, the per-unit revenues in
the contractual units are higher than market price, so that the decisionmaking margin of the
"lost" units produced (the least profitable or break-even units) always falls in the noncontrac-
tual market.
100. How are true losses measured where the seller's marginal costs are constant over
the relevant range of output? As Figures 2A, and 2A2 illustrate, producing at a lower level of
output makes no difference if the marginal cost curve is horizontal. These cost conditions can
exist for a monopolist even though its marginal revenue curve is declining. When the seller
with market power is producing at constant marginal costs, no adjustment will be made for a
breach. The seller will produce the same quantity of goods as it projected before the breach.
Further, because the seller is not producing under diseconomies of scale, the breach will
not generate any changes in cost conditions for the seller. Since this seller's marginal costs are
equal to its average variable costs, damages are accurately measured by the contract price less
the estimated unit cost of producing additional goods.
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2. Estimating loss by average costs: a litigation model.
The preceding analysis shows that using average cost data to
measure lost profits is inaccurate when marginal costs are increasing.
This distortion is offset to some extent by parallel mismeasurement of
savings. For example, the court in American Metal apparently used
average cost information when crediting the buyer with salvage prof-
its of $14 million. These "average" savings were then deducted from
the "average" lost profits to produce the $4 million damage award.
This offsetting effect suggests that average costs may only minimally
distort the true losses produced by the breach. However, the rela-
tionship between average-cost data depends in the first instance on
what units of production are used to calculate the average. For ex-
ample, the American Metal court used a figure of $. 16 average cost to
establish the savings produced by the breach. If this figure repre-
sented the average variable costs of all replacement units produced, it
would approximate the true savings on both the existing and breach-
created production. But, if the figure was based on the projected
average variable cost to produce the pre-breach output of T-ingots,
the average cost data would fail to credit the buyer with the "hid-
den" savings produced by the breach-induced shift in marginal costs.
Despite the greater accuracy of using marginal cost data, its use
would be inefficient where the reduction in error is purchased by an
even greater increase in litigation costs. Whether marginal cost data
are more expensive to determine than average cost information de-
pends upon the types of production data the seller has available,
which in turn is governed by the firm's need for various cost account-
ing information. For example, average cost is typically used in an
estimate or standard costs accounting system.' 0 ' This system is often
used by sellers who want to identify the costs of specific production
orders in order to control and compare total costs.' 0 2 However, if the
firm has increasing production costs, it will also need to determine
profit-maximizing output and price. Such data are found through a
101. Estimate and standard costs are predetermined costs based on past experience.
Thus, standard costs are frequently defined as "scientifically determined costs, often repre-
senting a considered judgment of what the cost should be under good performance." C. GIL-
LESPIE, COST AccoUNTING AND CONTROL 377 (1957). See also id. at 377-92, 402-21.
102. An estimate or standard costs accounting system is often used in conjunction with
"job order" costing by sellers in order to control the costs of specific, identifiable production
orders. Id. at 13, 46-62. The other basic type of cost-control system, process costing, also uses
average costs as a means of production control. Process costing accumulates costs and pro-
duction units period by period; cost per unit of goods is determined as an average unit cost for
the period. Id. at 14, 308-34.
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system of direct cost accounting which distinguishes manufacturing
costs that are fixed from those that vary with volume. 103 The margi-
nal costing mechanism used in a direct cost accounting system can
help determine accurate lost-profits measurements.
0 4
Since sellers use different accounting systems for different pur-
poses, we cannot predict which sellers will have access to marginal
cost data after the buyer's breach. Nevertheless, a legal damages rule
will operate efficiently if legal presumptions induce investment in ad-
ditional accuracy when the expected gain to the litigant exceeds the
additional expenditure. Initially, the seller's evidence must justify an
inference that unfinished production would have generated profits;'0 5
a prima facie case requires proving the revenues lost by the breach
less any savings in cost. Lost revenues are equal to the difference
between the contract price for the breached units and the gross re-
ceipts of any salvage. Changes in cost require more complex produc-
tion data. Typically, the seller will separate variable and fixed costs
103. In direct costing, unlike conventional or "absorption" costing, only the variable
manufacturing costs are regarded as production costs. Fixed production costs are treated as
period costs and immediately released as an expense. See 1 C. HORNGREN & J. LEER, CPA:
PROBLEMS AND APPROACHES TO SOLUbIONS 114 (4th ed. 1974).
104. The most important use of marginal cost data is to enable managers to determine
profit-maximizing output and price. In addition to "cost-volume-profit" relationships, margi-
nal costing aids other common managerial decisions. For example, what prices should be
quoted on special orders? Should the company manufacture components internally or ac-
quire them on the market? See C. GILLESPIE, supra note 101, at 652-60; Childres & Burgess,
supra note 7. However, to determine the profit-maximizing point the seller need only deter-
mine the portion of its MC and MR curves near its estimate of the profit-maximizing point.
If the seller can estimate the range in which its profit-maximizing point might lie, only a
segment of the MC curve will be analyzed with care.
Direct cost accounting will provide a proper basis by which the seller's true unit costs can
be estimated. The proof of these costs will come from past records, estimates, and expert
testimony-particularly cost accountants. Courts, however, have never had difficulty admit-
ting these kinds of proof as relevant and, where uncontroverted, dispositive. See, e.g., Western
Union Tel. Co. v. RJ. Jones & Sons, 211 F.2d 479 (5th Cir. 1954); Smith v. Onyx Oil &
Chem. Co., 120 F. Supp. 674 (D. Del. 1954), vacated and remanded, 218 F.2d 104 (3d Cir. 1955);
Betterman v. American Stores Co., 367 Pa. 193, 80 A.2d 66 (1951).
105. Traditionally, the seller has been required to establish two inferences in order to
make out a prima facie case of lost profits. First, the seller must establish that if the contract
had been performed it would have earned a net profit-that its estimated costs of production
were less than the contract price. See, e.g., Hinckley v. Pittsburgh Bessemer Steel Co., 121
U.S. 264 (1887); Tuttle v. Bootes Hatcheries & Packing Co., 112 F. Supp. 705 (D. Minn.
1953); Haddad v. Western Contracting Co., 76 F. Supp. 987 (N.D.W. Va. 1948). Second the
seller must establish that it could not mitigate damages by using the capacity the breach
released. See, e.g., Hinckley v. Pittsburgh Bessemer Steel Co., 121 U.S. 264 (1887); Hugo v.
Loewi, Inc. v. Geschwill, 186 F.2d 849 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 817 (1951).
Many pre-Code courts helped the seller overcome this mitigation burden by presuming
that market conditions made mitigation impossible. See, e.g., Mount Pleasant Stable Co. v.
Steinberg, 238 Mass. 567, 131 N.E. 295 (1921); Oswego Falls Pulp & Paper Co. v. Stecker
Lithographic Co., 215 N.Y. 98, 109 N.E. 92 (1915).
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in establishing losses, because courts deduct from the award any vari-
able costs saved by the breach. Since sellers using certain types of
accounting systems may not know their marginal costs, introducing
average variable costs efficiently establishes a prima facie case of lost
profits. This figure will roughly approximate the amount of true sav-
ings due to the shift in marginal costs.10 6 Where the error costs of
using average profits to measure both estimated losses and savings
exceed the cost of more refined production data, one of the litigants
will be induced to purchase greater accuracy through more precise
calculation of the seller's marginal costs. Thus, the incentive to re-
duce the seller's damage claim will encourage the buyer to invest re-
sources in establishing the existence and rate of the seller's increasing
marginal costs.
10 7
This section has suggested a litigation model determining lost
profits for salvaging sellers who lack a replacement market for the
finished goods. The central presumptions of this litigation model are
rooted in common law damage cases. Courts traditionally have
viewed approximate losses, based on average costs or other rough es-
timates, as sufficient to establish the prima facie case for recovery of
profits lost by breach.'0 8 Courts have also imposed on the salvaging
106. Where the buyer introduces evidence supporting an inference of released capacity,
mitigation incentives are retained by a legal presumption that some savings were produced by
the breach. Establishing the precise amount of savings, however, may not be cost-justified. A
presumption that the breach produced savings equal to the seller's average unit profit multi-
plied by the potential output released by the breach will roughly approximate true savings
based on the shift in marginal costs.
107. This evidence will support two inferences: (1) The true profits on the breached
units will be less than the average profits on all units of production; and (2) the breach will
produce savings by reducing the actual costs of other units of production, thus increasing the
profitable capacity to pursue additional sales.
Ready access to the seller's cost data through discovery makes possible such an investiga-
tion by the buyer, especially in cases like American Metal Climar, in which the damage liability
is substantial. Increasingly, courts have accepted records of past operations and prices, and
current market reports, as a basis for expert testimony on future demand and cost schedules.
See, e.g., Chain Belt Co. v. United States, 115 F. Supp. 701 (Ct. Cl. 1953); Friedman Iron &
Supply Co. v. J.B. Beaird Co., 222 La. 627, 63 So. 2d 144 (1952). In addition, advances in
cost accounting procedures permit drawing reasonable inferences from expert testimony
about the direction of a firm's marginal production costs. Several recent cases illustrate
buyer's efforts to reduce seller's average cost estimates by arguing that marginal costs are
increasing. See, e.g., Timber Access Indus. Co. v. U.S. Plywood-Champion Papers, Inc., 263
Or. 509, 503 P.2d 482 (1972).
108. See, e.g., Hinckley v. Pittsburgh Bessemer Steel Co., 121 U.S. 264, 272-78 (1887);
Tucson Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Aetna Inv. Corp., 74 Ariz. 163, 172-73, 245 P.2d 423,
429-30 (1952); Allen, Heaton & McDonald, Inc. v. Castle Farm Amusement Co., 151 Ohio
St. 522, 86 N.E.2d 782 (1949). But see MacKenzie Laboratories, Inc. v. Lawrence, 80 F. Supp.
710, 716 (D. Md. 1948); Royal Store Fixture Co. v. Bucci, 48 Pa. D. & C.2d 696, 701-03
(1969).
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seller the burden of proving that time and capacity savings did not
generate new profits.'0 9 If the seller failed to satisfy this burden, a
number of common law courts reduced the damages awarded by the
amount of fixed or overhead costs allocable to the released capac-
ity. 1° These cases have been subsequently criticized as improperly
including overhead as a cost "saved" by the breach.I" Nevertheless,
the assumption of increasing marginal costs suggests that the inexact
presumptions of these early cases may well approximate true losses
more accurately than lost-profits awards under U.C.C. § 2-708(2).112
C. Measuring Damages When There Are Multile Breaches
The preceding analysis illustrates the influence of increasing mar-
109. Pre-Code cases universally recognized that when the seller used raw materials and
released capacity to perform other contracts after the breach, breach-related profits mitigated
the damages. E.g., Hinckley v. Pittsburgh Bessemer Steel Co., 121 U.S. 264, 275 (1887) (cit-
ing the rule developed by the Court in Philadelphia, W. & B.R.R. v. Howard, 54 U.S. (13
How.) 331 (1851)); Isaacs v. Terry & Tench Co., 125 A.D. 532, 109 N.Y.S. 792 (1908); John-
ston v. Pittsburg Marble & Granite Works, 94 S.W.2d 831 (Tex. Civ. App. 1936); see RE-
STATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 335 (1932).
In addition, many courts recognized that both mitigation and comparative advantage
required imposing on sellers a burden of proving the savings produced by the breach. See,
e.g., Gruber v. S-M News Co., 126 F. Supp. 442 (S.D.N.Y. 1954); Apex Metal Stamping Co.
v. Alexander & Sawyer, Inc., 48 N.J. Super. 476, 138 A.2d 568 (1958); Allen, Heaton & Mc-
Donald, Inc. v. Castle Farm Amusement Co., 151 Ohio St. 522, 86 N.E.2d 782 (1949); Schu-
bert v. Midwest Broadcasting Co., I Wis. 2d 497, 85 N.W.2d 449 (1957).
110. C.W. Rantoul Co. v. Claremont Paper Co., 196 F. 305 (1st Cir. 1912); Columbus
Mining Co. v. Ross, 218 Ky. 98, 290 S.W. 1052 (1927); Apex Metal Stamping Co. v. Alexan-
der & Sawyer, Inc., 48 NJ. Super. 476, 138 A.2d 568 (1958); Forest Prod. Co. v. Dant &
Russell, Inc., 117 Or. 637, 244 P. 531 (1926).
111. See, e.g., R. NORDSTROM, supra note 7, § 177 (1970); Speidel & Clay, supra note 7,
at 694.
112. The damage cases litigated under § 2-708(2) involving salvaging sellers of special-
order goods have not recognized that released capacity may make other work more profitable.
Courts have generally permitted the seller to recover the difference between the contract price
less the average variable costs of producing uncompleted items plus or minus the proceeds of
salvaging incurred costs. See, e.g., City of Louisville v. Rockwell Mfg. Co., 482 F.2d 159 (6th
Cir. 1973); Holiday Mfg. Co. v. B.A.S.F. Systems, Inc., 380 F. Supp. 1096 (D. Neb. 1974);
Anchorage Centennial Dev. Co. v. Van Wormer & Rodrigues, Inc., 443 P.2d 596 (Alas. 1968);
Coast Indus. v. Noonan, 4 Conn. Cir. Ct. 333, 231 A.2d 663 (1967); American Metal Climax,
Inc. v. Essex Int'l, Inc., 16 U.C.C. REP. SERV. 101 (S.D.N.Y. 1974); Timber Access Indus. Co.
v. U.S. Plywood-Champion Papers, Inc., 263 Or. 509,503 P.2d 482 (1972); Paramount Litho-
graphic Plate Serv., Inc. v. Hughes Printing Co., 2 Pa. D. & C.3d 677, a fdwithout opinion, 377
A.2d 1001 (Super. Ct. 1977). Only in one or two cases is there any indication that the buyer
challenged the seller's computation by urging the use of more sophisticated accounting data.
See Timber Access Indus. Co. v. U.S. Plywood-Champion Papers, Inc., 263 Or. 509, 503 P.2d
482 (1972) (buyer argued that increasing marginal costs would decrease amount of claimed
profits); American Metal Climax, Inc. v. Essex Int'l, Inc., 16 U.C.C. REP. SERV. 101
(S.D.N.Y. 1974) (unspecified and unsuccessful challenge by buyer to sellers' cost accounting
methods.).
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ginal costs on seller's aggregate losses. This section suggests that
when there are two or more buyers of specialized goods, the proper
allocation of damages depends on the sequence of breach. Accu-
rately implementing the compensation principle requires allocating
damages among breaching buyers in proportion to their contribution
to the seller's losses. Figure 4 illustrates the conditions relevant to
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In interpreting Figure 4, assume that Amax contracts to supply
100 million pounds of special-order aluminum rods to both Essex and
ABC at a fixed price of $.25 per pound. In addition, Amax sells alu-
minum T-ingots on the spot market. Changed conditions making
aluminum rods less attractive than substitute materials cause Essex
to repudiate its contract to purchase aluminum rods. ABC subse-
quently breaches as well.
Figure 4 first suggests that where the seller's marginal costs are
increasing, the true losses attributable to each breach are not
equivalent. The first breach by Essex reduces the seller's production
of units of aluminum from 200 to 100 million. The lost profit for
those units, represented by shaded area 1, is the difference between
revenues and marginal costs for those 100 million units. When ABC,
the second contract buyer, breaches-even if only seconds later-its
breach will produce larger losses, as represented by shaded area 2.
The loss is smaller in the first instance because increasing costs make
producing units for Essex more expensive and the loss of that con-
tract less significant. The second breach, by contrast, causes the
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seller to lose profits on the initial units'13 of production, thus reduc-
ing expected profits.
Our analysis suggests that the anticipated profits lost when ABC
breaches are greater than those lost due to Essex's breach. In addi-
tion, the cost savings from new capacity released by the breaches are
not equally distributed. As Figure 4 is drawn, Amax responds effi-
ciently to the new profitable capacity produced by the shift in in-
creasing marginal costs. After both contracts are repudiated, the
seller expands its sales of T-ingots by 100 million pounds beyond pre-
breach estimates so that marginal cost will equal marginal revenue.
Against which breach should the cost savings be offset? As Figure 4
reveals, the savings are not distributed in equal amounts.
The first breach by Essex changes the relevant marginal cost
curve for sales to others from MC to MC,, making possible increased
profits on other units sold and on new sales. These increased profits
are represented by shaded area A. The second breach changes the
relevant marginal cost curve from MC, to MC2, creating the smaller
amount of savings represented by the shaded area B. Examining the
allocation of savings reveals that the initial breach generated greater
salvage opportunities. Increasing marginal costs also explain this un-
equal distribution of savings. Since the seller's costs are rising, its
ability to offset a second breach with savings on new opportunities is
less than the offset attributable to the initial breach.
The preceding analysis suggests that the first breach causes fewer
losses and permits greater cost savings, while the second breach gen-
erates greater losses offset by smaller cost savings. Since the first
breach operates in the middle range of costs, it has less impact on cost
savings and lost profits. The second breach, however, affects the
seller at an extreme where losses are more pronounced and gains
more dear.
Our analysis of multiple breach when the seller's marginal costs
are increasing demonstrates that the true losses attributable to the
second breach are measurably greater than those caused by the
first. 1 4 What are the legal implications of this observation? All
113. See note 99 supra.
114. The greater effects of subsequent breach are always premised on the assumption of
increasing marginal costs. If the second breacher can establish that marginal costs were rela-
tively constant over the relevant range of output, the "average out" method of attributing loss
would be accurate. In fact, it is theoretically possible (in the case where the seller has market
power) that marginal costs may be falling at the time of the second breach. Here, the subse-
quent damages would be lower than the initial loss caused by the first breach. The lack of




things equal, a damage rule that treats the breaches equally results in
inefficient behavior of both buyers. The first breacher, required to
pay more than its share of losses, is induced (absent renegotiation) to
perform an inefficient contract and forego welfare-enhancing gains
from alternative uses. In addition, a legal rule that treats the dam-
ages as equivalent insufficiently restrains the second breach by not
requiring damages for the full losses caused by that breach.
A basic justification for retaining the rule of equal damages per
unit of goods breached is that the costs of measuring lost profits can
be significant when the seller's marginal costs are increasing. Accu-
rately attributing losses to sequential breachers would require an
even greater expenditure. The same considerations that argue for
permitting the seller to use average cost data to establish lost profits
also favor a legal rule initially presuming equivalent costs over the
range of breaches.
Assume, however, that the first breacher voluntarily bears the ex-
pense of more accurately allocating the losses in order to reduce its
damages. What are the consequences of allowing the buyer to rebut
the equivalent damages presumption and apportion its losses accord-
ing to the sequence of breach? It might be argued that buyers, un-
able to foresee fully the consequences of breach, would not be able to
make accurate decisions about whether to breach. Uncertainty
about the costs of a breach may prevent efficient results. At a mini-
mum, uncertainty may require costly renegotiation of the initial con-
tractual assignment of risks.
But requiring that damages always be averaged among the sev-
eral breachers will also be costly whenever a seller has increasing
marginal costs. Under an average damages rule, subsequent
breachers shift some of the losses they cause to earlier breaches. A
rule which exposes a buyer to the possibility that its damages will be
greater if someone else has breached will promote efficiency by in-
ducing the buyer to examine this possibility before it decides to
breach.
Admittedly, precise marginal cost data may be unavailable in
most cases within the "crisis" period of the breach decision. How-
ever, the same uncertainty exists in cases of single breaches. The only
additional variable is the possibility of several breachers. A rule ask-
ing B2 to consider whether B, has already breached enhances effi-
ciency when the information costs to B2 are smaller than the savings
realized from increased accuracy in estimating the effects of a breach.
Allowing the presumption of equivalent damages to be rebutted by
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evidence of the relative impact of sequential breaches will increase
the certainty of damage liability for initial breachers. For example,
under the "average-out" rule, the first breacher observes its damages
increasing as successive breaches occur. It will not know its total
damages until all breaches have occurred. However, where cost data
can be used to apportion losses, each breacher can estimate its liabil-
ity at any point. All things equal, increasing the certainty of liability
will increase settlement rates while reducing costs of litigation and
delay.' 15
Thus, legal presumptions analogous to those developed in the liti-
gation model efficiently apportion losses for multiple breaches. Ini-
tial presumptions based on average cost data would produce an
equivalent rate of damages for sequential breaches. But if the ex-
pected gains from reducing liability induce an expenditure in accu-
rate measurement by an initial breacher, the legal rule enhances
efficiency by apportioning losses with the marginal cost data that this
investment reveals.
III. CONCLUSION
Traditionally, the common law had declared a clear preference
for a contract-market formula when measuring a seller's damages for
breach of contract. The U.C.C. damages scheme reflects this prefer-
ence for market damages, but a concern that the common law failed
to accurately measure certain sellers' true losses prompted the undis-
criminating lost-profits mechanism in U.C.C. § 2-708(2).116 Aban-
doning the test of marketability of the contract goods substantially
blurred the distinction between market and estimated profit meas-
ures. The current statutory language authorizing the recovery of lost
profits is unspecific, and gratuitous economic assumptions have
flawed attempts to define its scope. Freed from the "available mar-
ket" restraint of the pre-Code rule, recent cases and commentary
have encouraged use of the estimated profit mechanism to measure
115. A theory of efficient breach is more rigorously explored in Goetz & Scott, supra
note 1, at 562-68.
116. During bargaining there may be little incentive for the seller to give a potential
breacher accurate information concerning its marginal costs and relative position in the
breaching sequence. For example, if costs to the seller will be lower when the buyer performs
then it might seem to have an incentive to encourage the buyer not to breach. But this
argument neglects the seller's mitigation responsibilities and presupposes its incentives. The
seller cannot recover any damages that could have been avoided had it disclosed what it knew
about the consequences of breach. Furthermore, the only information the seller will disclose
is information that may potentially increase a given buyer's damages. By not revealing that B2
is a second breacher, the seller would be inducing rather than discouraging breach. Thus, if
systematic undercompensation causes sellers to prefer performance, accurate disclosure would
induce the desired behavior.
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losses for "lost-volume" and "components" sellers.
This article argues that the concern for reducing measurement
errors which prompted this increase in lost-profits recoveries is mis-
guided. Careful analysis reveals that neither the "lost-volume" nor
"components" category accurately identifies those cases where com-
pensation requires a departure from a market-contract formula. In
both cases the existence of a market implies that the seller may be
able to transform internal production costs into an available post-
breach market opportunity. If the breached contract is replaceable
by reselling the breached goods on the market, the difference be-
tween that market price and the contract price will accurately mirror
true losses. Although market imperfections will produce a divergence
between market damages and true losses in specific cases, assessing
these claims individually requires relatively sophisticated and fre-
quently inaccessible market and production data. We have therefore
argued that an initial presumption of replacement efficiently mini-
mizes total enforcement costs whenever sellers have access to a mar-
ket.
Lost-profit measures are useful for specialized contracts when the
seller responds to the breach by salvaging incomplete performance.
Here economic analysis suggests that true losses are often smaller
than conventionally measured damage awards. Nevertheless, be-
cause measuring estimated profits accurately is costly, reducing error
by introducing more accurate marginal cost data will frequently in-
crease the cost of litigation. While legal presumptions can reduce
this cost, evidence strongly suggests that the traditional common law
rules for measuring seller's damages represent an efficient solution to
the lost-profits puzzle."
17
117. A separate argument against allowing the sequence of breach to be relevant in
damage measurement is the ability of the seller to control the breach sequence in some cir-
cumstances-particularly anticipatory repudiations by the buyer. Under U.C.C. § 2-610, for
example, when a buyer anticipatorily repudiates its contract, the seller has a choice of ac-
cepting the breach or awaiting performance within "a commercially reasonable time." As-
sume, for example, that B, breaches its contract. The seller may-or may not-await
performance for a reasonable time. In that period B2 and B3 may--or may not-breach.
The sequence of breach could affect the cost of B's decision. The seller can justifiably wait
only when it believes that the buyer may retract its repudiation shortly. But if B 's breach is
unequivocal, the seller's "reasonable time" expires concurrently with the breach. In any
event, BI's damages should be based on the market price at or near the date of repudiation of
a contract for future delivery. See Jackson, supra note 12.
In short, the seller has only a limited ability to control the sequence of breach when a
buyer repudiates before the date of performance. The ability to assess B1 's larger damages
based on its ultimate position as a second breacher would exist, even theoretically, only when
BI's repudiation was equivocal. In that case it may be perfectly appropriate for B to con-
sider more carefully the consequences of an "uncertain" repudiation.
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